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‘What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you 
think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing – with a rather shaky 
hand – a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up under-
ground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itine-
rary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am 
no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask
me to remain the same: leave it to your bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in 
order. At least spare us their morality when we write.’
Michel Foucault.1
1 Foucault, M. 2005. P.19.
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‘Ultimately, everything has to do with everything.’
Jules Deelder.
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‘’I ain’t lookin’ to compete with you I don’t want to straight-face you
Beat or cheat or mistreat you Race or chase you, track or trace you
Simplify you, classify you Or disgrace you or displace you
Deny, defy or crucify you Or define you or confine you
(…) (...)
No, and I ain’t lookin’ to fight with you I don’t want to meet your kin
Frighten you or tighten you Make you spin or do you in
Drag you down or drain you down Or select you or dissect you
Chain you down or bring you down Or inspect you or reject you
(…) (….)
I ain’t lookin’ to block you up I don’t want to fake you out
Shock or knock or lock you up Take or shake or forsake you out
Analyze you, categorize you I ain’t lookin’ for you to feel like me
Finalize you or advertise you See like me or be like me’’2
(…)
2 Dylan, Bob. 2003. Another side of Bob Dylan. ‘All I really want to do’. New York: Columbia  
   Records. Sony entertainment.
6
content
abstract   1
Chapter 1 introductions
§ 1.1 premisses and research questions   8
§ 1.2 introduction   8
§ 1.3 relevance   9
§ 1.4 about style and method of the research 10
§ 1.5.1 literature review: 18
§ 1.5.2 ‘foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ 19
§ 1.5.3 a nuance which describes a problem as more complex 22
§ 1.5.4 neoliberal biopolitics; what it means on a personal level 23
§ 1.5.5 the complexity of contextualizing 29
§ 1.6 about inept contemporary survival skills & criminalization of homelessness 33
§ 1.7 narratives: three stories about ones places in [society] 42
Chapter two [society] for [itself]              
§ 2.1 [society] as myth              49   
§ 2.2 [society] as analytical grid for governmentality              53
§ 2.3 [society] as autopoietic and allopoetic 55  
§ 2.4 [society] for [itself]              59   
§ 2.5 [society] represented by [itself]              61
§ 2.6  some concluding remarks 63
Chapter three 
Conclusion: Are welfare policies to [include] homeless people counterproductive?              68
literature                           72
7
Chapter 1: introductions
§ 1.1 premisses and research question
Premise 0: [Society] is a myth. (Schinkel, 2008). As such it cannot observe [itself]; but [it] 
nevertheless assumes [it] can, and attempts so manically.
Premise 1: Alleged [in- and exclusion] requires the application of an alleged knowable and fixed
space - for example, and commonly objectified as – [society].
Premise 2: [society] and [normality] are normalizing3 discourses.
Premise 3: There are, and will always be, people whom are comparatively less skilled and gifted
than others to have a productive life.
Premise 4: Social work will improve by not focusing too analytically how to improve social
work.
The question in this research is:  
Are welfare policies to ‘include’ homeless people counterproductive?4
§1.2. introduction
Three narratives about homeless men problematize the readiness of the Dutch legal system and 
welfare organizations to describe ‘(dis-)placement’ of homeless people. Thereafter the premise 
3 According to Foucault a ‘normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation 
intersect along an orthogonal articulation.’  (Foucault, M. 2003. p.253). 
4 This question is at the same time a ‘liberal’  and a ‘neoliberal biopolitical’ question. A question without boundaries in 
order to measure alleged  ‘inclusion’ as productive manifests in itself a certain naïvity of the author regarding the far-
fetching, one might even say overwhelming implications of contemporary neoliberal biopolitics (Alt, 2014). At the end 
of this research the stress between liberalism and neoliberalism ought to be disentangled. We have choosen to 
continue with this in a way too unclear question because it will by default need to consider liberalism and 
neoliberalism. Therefore we proceed initially naïve.  Secondly it is not clear what (counter-)productive means; Such a 
stance needs a quantitative or qualitative scale for measurement; To ask such an unclear question without a scope of 
measurement is by default too ‘wide’.  There will be no quantitative research be conducted, and the insights on this 
research has an explorative qualitative character, but the problem of this research’ design will not be solved. In the 
conclusion we will reconsider this problem. 
This naïvity is not feigned; there has been a  lack of an awareness of  the depths of biopower and it’s 
implications at the beginning of this research, and as such this work, in its naïvity, is a real research as that throughout 
the period of the writing of this work the perspectives of the author have changed. See as well §1.4. 
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that alleged [exclusion] requires the application of an alleged knowable and fixed space - namely 
[society] - will be explained. This research questions if there can possibly exist a constitutive ele-
ment of [society], if not a negative constitution - an abyss. It will critically claim that the apparent 
[exclusion] from [society] is epistemologically weak but nevertheless productive, namely that 
[society] works as incentive and [fundament] to apply an analytical grid which serves as rationale 
for the sanctioning of so to say abnormal or deviant life. [Inclusion] and the sanctioning of abnor-
mal life will be considered as two sides of the same coin; [Inclusion] serves as incentive to influen-
ce - and hence in neoliberal biopolitical systems sanction – unproductive people. [Society] as con-
cept needs to be scrutinized in order to research its workings. Critical attitudes for social workers 
and other professionals will be briefly considered as a nuance of a persistent description of 
[society] might be part of more sensitive, gentle and immanent approaches to the problems and 
disabilities of homeless people. Throughout this work its research and its writings will be perpe-
tually considered performative acts and as such scrutinized.5 Therefore this research has at times 
an unconventional approach. 
§ 1.3 relevance
On May 31th 2017 the Netherlands national news agency published an extensive article about 
contemporary homelessness in The Netherlands.6 According to Dutch Salvation Army representati-
ve Diana Nieuwold shelters for homeless in The Netherlands are overcrowded as there is currently 
not enough capacity to shelter all homeless people in the country.7 The scarcity of cheap housing 
5 To avoid logical auto-confirmations the research aims to critically scrutinize itself; likely a devious, pretentious and 
contentious intention which could stíll suffer from contemporary circular logics nevertheless.
6 Source: http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2175879-ook-jij-kan-in-een-vingerknip-dakloos-worden.html, consulted on 
14.06.2017.
7 This statement indicates The Netherlands does not have a ‘house first’ policy, as is applied in Finland for example; 
‘Housing First means ending homelessness instead of managing it. The basic idea is to offer permanent housing 
and needs-based support for homeless people instead of temporary accommodation in hostels or in emergency 
shelters. Permanent housing means an independent rental flat with own rental contract.’ Source: 
https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2017/mar/22/finland-solved-homelessness-eu-crisis-housing-
first, and https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2016/sep/14/lessons-from-finland-helping-homeless-
housing-model-homes, consulted on 18.08.2017. My take why only Finland applies a ‘housing first’ policy is that it 
contradicts neoliberal policymaking common elsewhere in the European Union. For example, the housingmarket 
in The Netherlands has been liberalized thoughout last decade, and a ‘house first’ policy would be contradicting 
with the liberal, and overstrained, real estate market.
I could not find any relevant information about what happens to illegal homeless people within the 
‘house first’ policy in Finland, as I assume homeless illegal people might cause legal and organizational problems 
and that therefore the housing-first only applies to people with a Finnish social security number. As well 
newsarticles such as the quoted Guardian articles do not refer to problematic phenomena of homeless people 
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accomodations is the reason for the current rise in homelessness in the Netherlands according to 
Nieuwold. The article mentions that basically everybody has a chance to become homeless in case 
somebody is exposed to bad luck and is not able to tackle emerging problems promptly. Additio-
nally, substance addictions, mental health problems and depressions, divorces, deaths of relatives 
and economic problems are considered risk factors for homelessness. The recommendations of the
Dutch Salvation Army to tackle homelessness are on the one hand a plea for more and cheaper 
housing facilities but as well a call for more prevention: "The municipalities, housing corporations 
and welfare agencies must work well together. As soon as a housing corporation signals that the 
rent is not paid or there are complaints about the resident there should be immediate intervention.
There should be good arrangements between the involved parties. What we (FN: The Netherlands 
Salvation Army) would like to see is that people can live in social housing apartments. And if the 
problem case (sic.) refuses necessary help, a housing corporation has an incentive to intervene: 
‘you (FN: a problematic resident) live in our’ apartment so we can force you to accept professional 
help.’ We need better collaboration and coordination to prevent more people from being on the 
streets." (Translated by author). Many people probably underscore such incentives, because who 
would like to live in dire circumstances without ‘a roof’? However, I aim to show homelessnes and 
related issues are not as easily tackled as there might be some initially unforeseen side effects that 
problematize such activist, steadfast and positivist endeavors. 
§.1.4 about the style and method of the research
The forthcoming research is twofold; The narrating practical illustrations serve to disentangle a 
philosophical and biopolitical problem. Ideally and hopefully the opposite will be the case too; that
a philosophical and biopolitical research will shed another light on the problem of the description 
of an imaginary ‘placement’ of homelessness in – or usually ‘outside’ – [society].8 Between these 
two aims a fold might exist that comprises a relevant aspect for the forthcoming research; namely 
a fold that will be a scrutiny to the research’s own style and reasonability. 
The style of the research is important as it constitutes its reason; an unusual and free style 
will allow us to postpone commonly applied concepts such as [society], because ‘the tranquility 
who persistently resist care, as for example the three men described in §1.7. 
8 To inquire the limits of the reasonability of a description of (society) as obvious might be relevant for social science
  and -policy, even if it would funcion only as an admonition.
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with which (it is) accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of them-
selves, but are always the result of a construction (of) rules of which must be known, and the justi-
fications of which must be scrutinized. (…) Should we regard them as illusions, illegitimate con-
structions, or ill-acquired results? Should we never make use of them, even as a temporary support,
and never provide them with a definition? What we must do, in fact, is to tear away from them 
their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems that they pose; to recognize that they are not 
the tranquil locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning their structure, coherence, sys-
tematicity, transformations) may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster of ques-
tions.’ (Foucault, 1972. P.28, 29). Foucault mentioned in his debate with Chomsky the importance 
to ‘criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criti-
cize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.’ (Chomsky, N. 2006. 
P.64). Although I believe an increase of knowledge about homelessness and their related problems 
might rebut some persistent popular held assumptions about it9 - and that such a nuance could 
help to describe homelessness differently - I would like to investigate and problematize mostly, 
after Foucaults instruction, what is constituting the rationality of the discourses on homelessness 
and, moreover, what ‘falls outside’ of that discourse. 
In order to steadfastly recall to the stress between the complex, open and multiple, and a 
spatialized research I apply an alternative for a [defined topic] as core instrument in forthcoming 
research. I apply a mythical but nevertheless relevant aspect of my research as bracketed instead 
of having it defined. (Schinkel, 2008). Brackets symbolize the ‘enclosed matter […] in logic as sign 
of aggregation.’10 I assume it is of key importance in my research to consider how a ‘group, body 
or mass is composed of many distinct parts’11 and how ‘units or parts (are) collected into a mass or 
9 For example statements such as: ‘it’s a (lifestyle) choice to be homeless’. See for example the Guardians March 10th 
2016 article ‘'It's not a lifestyle choice': homelessness on the streets of Manchester’. Source: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/10/homelessness-streets-manchester-outreach-rough-sleepers-
housing, consulted on 22.05.2017.
10 Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bracket, consulted on 
16.02.2017
11 Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation, consulted 
on 16.02.2017. Source: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation
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whole12 13 while it recognizes in the meanwhile ‘the condition of being so collected.’14 In other 
words, the brackets warn us that the aggregation is a human product of composition and 
exclusion. They remind us other compositions might have been possible as well. The brackets 
recollect that something is left outside those while the apparent unity or connector of ‘the object’, 
[for example society], between the brackets might rely júst on those brackets, and that therefore 
the brackets, [    ], so to say disguise an abyss or hollow.
Secondly the brackets serve another purpose, namely to discuss the workings of [the topic] 
while the actual evaluation of the alleged ‘sub-stance’ or ‘es-sense’ of [it] is postponed or even 
evaded. This works alike Husserl’s phenomenological method in which ‘scientific, cultural and phi-
losophical prejudices’ (Farina, G. 2014. P. 53) are postponed in order to focus on the analysis of 
‘historically constructed conceptions.’ (Ibid.). In order to describe the meaning and inclinations of 
[topic] I aim to move around [it] and possibly disentangle its workings. [It] even might be 
problematized in a manner that [the topic] disappears once it is scrutinized thoroughly; that [it] 
functions like a myth. (Schinkel, 2008).
People whom are apparently problematic are often and readily described as being [outside 
of society]. (Schinkel, 2008). Such a description could apply to people in jail, asylum seekers, immi-
grants, homeless people but as well handicapped people, people in ‘low’ social economic classes, 
(ex-)inmates, criminals, mentally ill people, women, homosexuals, jobless, handicapped people, el-
derly, illiterate people, children or even people-who-do-not-use-computers, in other words: every-
thing and everybody who can be considered as ‘social pathology’. (Schinkel, 2007). These people 
have to [integrate], and in speaking, writing and thinking about [integration] an artificial distinction
as performative act is maintained between [society] and [outside society]. (Oostdijk, E &. L. Ten 
Kate, 2010). The problem of this kind of ‘placement’ or spatializing in/out of [society] will be inves-
tigated in the forthcoming research because of the free and uncritical application of [inclusion] - 
12 Ibidem.
13 In this research I considered to apply the philosophical term meriology as the study of the parts and the wholes they
form. I have studied Husserls ‘On the Theory of Wholes and Parts.’ (1970). However, I found Husserl’s content 
particularly difficult to apply in my casestudy, and secondly I consider the idea of ‘whole’ problematic. Therefor I will 
not use the term meriology in this research.
14 Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation, consulted 
on 16.02.2017. Source: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation
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[exclusion] or [inclusion] - [society] binary mechanisms in contemporary European political 
discourses.15
Such a scrutinizing approach implies I do not assume there exists an unmediated and un-
problematic relation between linguistic signs and the signified: I do not assume that words point 
out unequivocally and unproblematically the social reality, but after Foucault I consider [society] as
discourse; as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, dis-
courses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. 
It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (...) and to speech. It is this ‘more’ that
we must reveal and describe.’’ (Foucault, 1972. P. 54). In order to reveal such ‘more’, what falls be-
sides common discourse about [society] and [integration] and describe how an allegedly [inclu-
sive] mechanism might frustrate, and therefore [exclude] I apply a critical and slow approach. Ac-
cording to Foucault scientific discourses are such complex forms that scientists ought to approach 
them not only on various levels but as well with different means. (1973). Different theories will be 
combined and connected to my own work experience in a shelter for homeless people described 
as narrative illustrations.
One of the tasks of philosophy is to reflect on the conditions of knowledge production in 
scientific disciplines. Within a philosophical approach one could research certain scientific require-
ments, for example ‘objectivity’, and consider critically why they are allegedly objective or certain: 
Why and how do I apply certain stipulations, plans, layouts and executions for scientific research? 
Philosophy is not a regular normal scientific discipline with a priori instructions and therefore it has
agility regarding its method and researched areas. I apply a philosophical approach as some persis-
tent underlying assumptions about homelessness are to be scrutinized. Form and content are 
equally important to achieve that: When I perform a certain statement I simultaneously investigate
choices about the design of the research, as I have for example already considered the ordinary16 
applications of a certain word problematic. Due to its metareflective style the forthcoming exercise
15 In this research we will not focus on ‘marginalized groups’ as that is not an interesting and relevant theoretical 
research. As such we do not a priori aim to defend or ‘liberate’ the underdog in (society) in a Gramscian or in other 
words neomarxist attempt to overcome or at least palliate the suffering of the ‘oppressed’. Such an uncritical binary 
between oppressor and oppressed is to be critized; If one engages with the excluded one acknowledges ex- or 
implicitly that (in)- and (exclusion) is a crucial distinction. (Schinkel, 2007. P. 456). Schinkel pleads for a critical stance 
which problematizes the frame of which applies an essential distinction between suppressor and suppressed. (Ibid.). 
Foucaults notion of power as ‘the mobile ground of plural power relations’ as described in ‘The Will to Knowledge’ 
chapter ‘method’ will be applied in this research. (1985).
16 With ordinary I mean in this context uncrititical, and with uncritical a lack of self- and methodological scrutiny. 
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might appear as ‘slow’, or as even going around in loops; Some descriptions are apparent obvious-
ness’s which are in my approach - maybe annoyingly - repeating themselves. Loops appear to bring
us nowhere or I might end up exactly on the same spot as started. But hopefully this style works as 
loophole: that in the slowly moving and scrutinizing of its own style the content transforms and ap-
pears in another light, possibly as anomaly. I hope to be able to show that something can be achie-
ved with such a (dis-)orderly endeavor and that a certain boldness regarding its scientific merit 
might be appropriate and useful, and could maybe even fun and interesting. However, I am not 
that bald. I think there is at least a tacit legacy of a logical positivist approach17 in western univer-
sities. I feel I ought to tribute with this research to sciences and [societies] in general. I ought to 
serve readers in particular by creating an eloquent and logical exposé about a clearly and logically 
defined, delimited18 and relevant researchtopic concluded with applicable results. I feel I am not 
able to fulfill such an imperative however, at least not directly. A command for relevancy, clarity 
and especially applicability namely imply that the outcomes of the research wíll be useful – and 
one should in such case take into account useful to whom or to what? - and that a researchtopic 
cán be defined. In case applicability prevails in a research it probably means it is designed for a cer-
tain purpose, with a practical goal in mind. In such an approach there is an apparent consensus 
about what ‘the problem’ is, and moreover that it can be solved as well. I am worried that the po-
wers resolving [a topic], for example who describes it as a problem and how such is done, is not 
critically examined in such an applied research.19 In other words there seems consensus about or 
within a certain discourse. The frame of the research is apparently given, the direction of the re-
search is ostensibly evident and clear. I do not want to accept certain descriptions, though they 
might be considered to be ‘self-evident’. Its self-evidence functions alike autopoiesis20 or, even bet-
ter, as an autopoietic machine. (Maturana, H.R. & F.J. Varela. 1972). In other words, by the accep-
tance of a description it starts to function as such; the application is an performative act.21
Homeless people and the resolving problems apparently aren’t easily ‘grasped’. Hence I believe a 
17 With a tacit legacy of a logical positivist approach I mean science which describes cases which are empirically 
observable and verifiable.
18 In delimiting the quality of the work will become apparent as the difficulty of good research lies in making decisions
   about the scope of it. What kind of premises and definitions are applied? What is essential in the research and what
   should be left out?
19 Scientific disciplines can rely on a assumption which will not be fundamentally questioned within that discipline. As 
long a phase of normal science is productive there is no need for fundamental research which might lead to a scientific
revolution. (Kuhn, 1977).
20 Schinkel (2007) and Foucault. (2001).
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clear positioning of the research question within a certain discipline, a timeframe and a space does
not function well; but moreover such an imperative is exactly the problem! So this research is not 
alike a puzzle where the last pieces are put in the right place; I does not know what the puzzle or 
picture will look like, if the pieces are compatible or if there are some pieces missing, (probably!), if
the fragments will ever be fitting into a finalized state, and if there is a frame in the first place. 
Hence I think that to start - or to end a research as that is concerned with this work – is actually 
more like merging or tuning in into open and interminable processes and discussions consisting of 
different and fluctuating histories, various geographical places, languages, work fields and scientific
disciplines. However, a contemporary quick fix22 to label unclear academic endeavors and -projects
21As I disagree with this framing I will persistently avoid to mention it. Schinkel mentions that people are only excluded 
from society the moment people start talking about [integration]; it is a performative act. (2005).
Perpetually I have been considering if I should start this study with narrative case studies and ‘zoom’ from 
there ‘out’ to theoretical approaches or if I should start with a philosophical and sociological analysis and move from 
there to practices. After ample deliberation and a lot of shuf-fling of different paragraphs I decided to explain instead 
why my style is (hopefully, but at least mostly initially) so indecisive while I wont further bother you with the chicken 
or egg alike question if theory or practice ought to deliberated first: I will blend theoretical insights with practice based
narratives. I mingle theories and narratives as I believe a singular focus on either will not have the argumentative 
strength I aim for in this research. Form and content are equally important. There is not really a clear cut distinction 
between the two even, as they are reciprocally constituted. A focus on either two will just not do as I intend to ‘catch’ 
things which are ‘not fitting in’ into either approach. Therefore I bid for your willingness to accept the unconventional 
styles and changes between of the one hand creativity and on the other hand ‘knowledge’ in this research.  It has been
as if the research topic was buzzing inside my body for years: The incessant variations in dimensions caused the buzz. If
I assumed to ‘catch’ the issue through thís way, the problem appears ‘elsewhere’. If I ‘highlighted’ or ‘underscored’ 
something the verges and the limitedness of that ‘grabbed’ appeared, whereas the problems were beyond. In case a 
pivot point is highlighted the actual pivotal point appeared elsewhere. If verges do exist (that is to be found out yet) 
be-tween different descriptions than I want to investigate those verges. You might have noticed that spatial 
descriptions are quite persistent in (my) language. Hu-mans, and our descriptions, are apparently going ‘higher’ and 
‘under’, we are next to a verge, there are ‘subs’, we can be in a center, on a margin, in a periphery, above or below, and
a pivot is rotating. Why do spatial descriptions appear so persistent in my writing and in the descriptions of our 
organizations and our life’s? Is this the best I can do to describe my problem? What if there is no solid ground, no fixed 
space, and no hierarchical order? My issue is similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s whom cried out loud we have suffered 
enough from arborescent trees! (1987). How to spatialize – how to bracket - the problem of spatialization? What to 
compare it with then? Can you do science without comparisons?
 Braidotti mentions about her style of writing that a ‘’philosophy which aims to think otherwise about 
'difference' will use a different style than usual. (…) Form and content reflect one another. The search for new views 
and figurations imply to explore different styles. (This) approach is therefore anything but lineair, but full of rizomatic 
facets. Such makes the notion of ‘style’ of major importance. Style is an essential tool for the philosophers task’ to 
create new configurations and concepts. Style is more than a rhetorical appliance because it makes the unthinkable 
thinkable and the unimaginable conceivable. Knowledge and creativity (non-italics by FN) is needed for such an 
endeavour, but as well the freedom to break away from established patterns of thought (…) and sterile protocols of 
academic discourse.’’(Braidotti, 2004. P. 7).
22 Such an approach does not really investigate but accepts the problematic situation for what it is. Sloterdijk considers
such an attitude intellectual defeatism. ‘Philosophical thought has always tried to tell us who we are and what we 
should do; (…) Whoever finds this ambition outlandish should consider that while it is certainly provocative to assert it, 
it would be an act of intellectual defeatism to abandon it.’  (Sloterdijk, 2013. P.3). I do not claim to solve the 
incommensurabilityproblem, nor solve the problem in my research, but that does not mean we should not talk about 
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as inter- or multidisciplinary does not do. In multi- or interdisciplinarity resonates the problem of 
incommensurability as described by Kuhn. (1977).23 Incommensurability is often illustrated with 
the use of a story about six blind humans who have to describe an elephant, as they are blind, by 
touch: One person holds the elephant’ proboscis and describes what she feels as something like a 
snake. Another feels the tusk and describes it to be like a spear. A third person touches the leg and 
considers it a tree, etcetera. (Denzin, N.K. & M.D. Giardina. 2008). The bottom line is that every 
blind person describes, as metaphor for a scientist, the ‘world’ according to what they ‘feel’, in 
other words, through their own paradigm. Denzin & Giardina claim that the blind humans and 
elephant story teaches us that humans ‘can never know the true nature of things. We are each 
blinded by our own perspective. Truth is always partial, fractured, contested, performed.’ (Ibid. P. 
29). Though this illustrates the incommensurability problem well, the allegory implies – and needs 
– the very existence of the elephant! Therefore Denzin & Giardana can apply the elephant and ‘the
truth’ in the same paragraph. (Ibid.)  What if the blind people were for example touching some bo-
dy parts representing an elephant used in a stage play where there is no actual whole elephant: 
that their constitutive descriptions make an experience of a ‘true’ ‘elephant’. I problematize the 
story about six blind humans and the elephant because the story and it adherents ignored that the
object of the research could be constructed by the very research!
I am writing and researching so to write in medias res, in the middle of actions, because 
there is no real nor fixed starting point or demarcated research topic and probably no end point of 
research either. In other words, I consider the act of researching as an open and ongoing process; 
not to find a ‘solution’ to a ‘problem’24 postulated by somebody else. Though this remarks might 
appear as a refusal of the research’s applicability, coherence and logic, I aim to clarify with the 
forthcoming work why my language is initially so indecisive.25 I think this refusing style might ac-
tually provide space to see, describe and approach things (humans) in a different manner. Some 
it!
23 Braidotti considers it a positive skill that she associates freely - and move swiftly - between scientific disciplines. 
(Braidotti, 2004). My experiences are more negative and therefore sceptic. In my opinion an academic Esperanto does 
not exist: there are many miscommunications. That gives space for very unscientific misuse of power. That does not 
mean that one should not try hard to get your arguments as descriptively and clearly out either. Lack of 
commensurable and even lack of comprehensible language might lead to misuse of power, in a nutshell to 
developments of which the critical imperative of the enlightenment project should activate us to be acting against. 
Under the guise of a’ cover of love’ dialogue a lot of power struggles are concealed.
24 For example the last decade populist tendency to ‘say it as it is’, in regard of immigrants, Islamic people or the EU in 
western countries.
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persistent ‘problems’ might be handled practically and theoretically differently if it is approached 
in another manner. I apply a different approach as I want to do a critical and fundamental research.
I use neologisms and new concepts26 -  Deleuze describes a concept as ‘philosophical precisely 
because they create possibilities for thinking beyond what is already known or assumed.’ (Cole-
brook, 2002. P. 19) - in order to make very clear that I do not want to adhere to certain meanings. A
relevant orientation to illustrate the forthcoming work is Deleuze’ and Guattari’s concept of multi-
plicity. ‘A multiplicity is in the most basic sense a complex structure that does not reference a prior 
unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot 
be considered manifold expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. On these grounds, 
Deleuze opposes the dyad One/Many, in all of its forms, with multiplicity. Further, he insists that 
the crucial point is to consider multiplicity in its substantive form – a multiplicity – rather than as 
an adjective – as multiplicity of something. Everything for Deleuze is a multiplicity in this fashion.’ 
(Roffe, J. 2010. P.181). Multiplicity can be elucidated in the metaphor of the rhizome; which is a 
mass of roots. Rhizomes are rampant, transversal and cross-linking strings which proliferate hori-
zontally - taken after botany, underground - and connect in potentially infinite ways.27 ‘Perhaps one
of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways.28 
(Deleuze & Guattari. 2004. P.14). ‘In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierar-
25 Mary Douglas hinted why I feel so uneasy, because I namely think I touch a taboo. ‘Taboo protects the local 
concensus on how the world is organised. It shores up wavering certainty. It reduces intellectual and social disorder. 
We may well ask why is it necessary to protect the primary distinctions of the universe, and why are taboos so bizarre? 
The second theme answers this with reflections on the cognitive discomfort caused by ambiguity. Ambiguous things 
can seem very threatening. Taboo confronts the ambiguous and shunts it into the category of the sacred.’ (Douglas, M. 
1966. xi). She continues that to ‘be holy is to be whole, to be one: holiness is unity, integrity, perfection of the individual
and of the kind.’ (Douglas, M. 1966. P. 67). I suddenly realised I am trying to open up a taboo by question [society]. 
Hence my style is initially so apologetic; exactly because I will question concensus about how the world is organised, I 
will be disorderly: question ‘order’. Given some experiences I had with professors in my recent years, touching taboos 
can be threatening.
See as well Dale and Burrel: ‘Emplacement implies control in space through fixing. It indicates a certain ordering or
organisation: everything and everybody are put in their rightful places. Fixity is also associated with knowledge, with 
the achievement of a crucial ‘grid of intelligibility’ (…). It is a central part of many disciplines. Geography (maps), 
geometry (co-ordinates), architecture (buildings), anatomy (the fixing and straining of tissue sections), surveying 
(triangulation) and many more are all fundamentally based in the fixing of knowledge through their techniques of 
‘emplacement’.  (Dale, K. & B. Burrel. 2008. P.53).
26 According to Deleuze the task of philosophy is to create concepts. A concept is according to him not an ‘abstract 
idea representing the fundamental characteristics of what it represents.’ (concept according to wikipedia. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept, consulted on 29.03.2017). Therefore concepts ‘are not labels or names that we
attach to things; they produce an orientation or a direction for thinking’.  (Colebrook, C. 2002, P.15).
27 Diverse in quality and infinite in quantity: ‘always n- 1 dimensions.’ (Deleuze & Guattari. P. 7. 2004).
28 I consider multiple here as infinite and random.
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chical modes of communication and pre-established paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierar-
chical, non-signifying without a General29 and without an organizing memory or central automa-
ton, defined solely by a circulation of states.´ (Deleuze & Guattari. P.23. 2004). Every point in such 
networks can connect with any possible other point. Connections can be broken at any point, 
without disconnecting the multiple fundamentally, because the rhizomatic network burrows as 
well into countless other connections. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). In other words, the most 
important feature of a rhizomatic network is the pluralism – the lack of a center – and the move-
ment and variation. (Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks. 2001). There is a possibility of increase of dimensions 
of plurality, a multiplicity of connections, in which the character changes perpetually too. There are
no fixed points and it is not susceptible for a structured or generative model. For example, accor-
ding to Deleuze and Guattari trees- or root(model)s provide a sad image of a thinking that 
perpetually imitate the multiple by assuming a center or unity. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). Such 
thinking is considered by them as arborescent thinking, marked by dualism30 and totalizing princi-
ples. In such models information is only connected from a higher unity to a successive element, 
through already existing channels of communication.
§ 1.5.1 Literature review
This paragraph examines diverse literature related to neoliberal biopolitics and homelessness. 
Besides well-known philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Žižek we will, among others, 
consider Willse’s biopolitical take on homelessness. The consulted literature is an amalgam from 
various scientific fields, such as philosophy, sociology and social geography, political science, social 
work, law and health policy research. This indicates that biopolitics is currently relevant and there-
fore vividly applied in various fields. The kaleidoscopic character of this review is as well indicative 
of the difficulty to describe homelessness holistically; It appears that the respective scholars descri-
be homelessness indirectly by posing a certain scientific, political or societal problem in relation to 
homelessness and through the connection of such a problem or practice an insight on homeless-
ness is created. We will briefly consult the development of Michel Foucault’s coinage, notably his 
final lecture of the ‘Society must be defended’ lecture series in 1976, to subsequent contemporary 
29 Such as objectivity.
30 Among others Braidotti mentions that in dualistic oppositions - a tautology in itself – the one pole forms by 
definition the deviation of the, dominant, other. (2004).
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applications of biopolitics. Neoliberalism as (bio-)political spectrum and what this means for con-
temporary western people shall be considered as well. Besides offering a brief overview of biopoli-
tics as concept and a short overview of the state of the art of biopolitical studies this review will 
inter alia problematize some aspects of the literature which will respectively be applied to explain 
the relevance of this research. We will for example problematize the contextualization of home-
lessness hereafter. A relevant distinction between U.S.A.’s caring policies, or maybe more cynically 
put the lack thereof, and the by the author described Dutch policies will be made in paragraph 1.6. 
This difference will explain why this research is a relevant take on biopolitical practices compared 
to the studies from the U.S.’. The literature review will as well pave the way to the general issue re-
searched in this work, namely the problematic application of the concept [society].
§ 1.5.2 ‘foster life or disallow it to the point of death’
Foucault coined biopower as a modern developmental succession from disciplinary mechanisms 
applied by sovereign powers.31 32 In the latter part of modernity a new system of political power 
has developed which Foucault coined biopolitical regulation; The health of the bios, the whole 
socius, man-as-species became the object of reference. The well-being and productivity as popu-
lations as whole became the objective for contemporary political systems. Economical, political 
and sociological problems are to be described in statistical terms.33 (Foucault, M. 2003). Sociolo-
gical monitoring became therefore a necessary tool for political power ‘through an entire series of 
interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population. (Foucault, M. 2003. P.139). 
31 Disciplinary mechanisms were applied by sovereign powers whom had the ‘right to take life or let live’ (Foucault, M. 
2003. p.138). Such absolute rulers were so to say the representative of the most absolute ruler, god. Medieval 
monarchs ruled as sovereigns.
32 Disciplinary mechanisms are still applied, though in a contemporary form, and that taken together with biopolitics 
Foucault calls ‘biopower’.
33 Typical biopolitical examples of studies to the productivity of society as whole is for example Jobe’s remark that 
‘(o)ne of the central problems of the public health industry at least since the 1960s has been to address what the 
National Center for Health Statistics has called “the burden of death and illness experienced by low-income groups as 
compared with the nation as a whole.”’ (Jobe, K.S. 2010). Furhtermore Jobe mentions ‘that the regulation of homeless 
populations through these mechanisms of biopower constitute homeless populations as a biological threat to society 
at large, and that this begins to explain why population-based approaches to improving the health of homeless groups 
exacerbates rather than corrects health disparities between homeless groups and the rest of society.’ (Ibid.). Frohlich 
writes similarly issues between specific target groups and population level interventions. (Frohlich et al. 2008).
Another exemplary example of a contemporary form of biopolitics, where the assumption is held that 
problems can be ‘tamed’ is Phelan’s remark that ‘(h)omelessness damages the physical and mental health ofthose who
are homeless and poses risks for the nonhomeless population by contributing to the spread of diseases such as 
tuberculosis and AIDS. Thus, it is of critical public health importance to understand what causes homelessness, how it 
can be prevented, and how episodes of homelessness can be shortened.’  (Phelan, J.C. & B.G. Link. 1999).
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Agamben defines biopolitical life as 'the assimilation of natural life in the mechanisms and calcula-
tions of state power and politics'. Power over life (F.N.: was) not exercised in this by a sovereign ru-
ler; statistics are used as input for the actions of the government.’ (Schuilenburg, 2008. P.1).
According to Foucault biopolitics meant that the pre- and early modern sovereign power 
was ‘replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death. (Foucault, M. 2003. 
P.138). The ‘letting die’ is by Foucault operationalised through the notion of racism, which he clari-
fies as the technique to establish hierarchies between different groups.34 (Clough Marinaro, 2009). 
Foucault describes this as well as the ‘killing’ by biopolitical powers, but immediately nuances his 
rather radical statement: ‘When I (F.N.: Michel Foucault) say ‘killing’, I obviously do not mean 
simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to 
death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, 
rejection, and so on. (Foucault, M. P.256). Various scholars (Clough Marinaro, I. 2009, Beckett & 
Herbert, 2010, Boarder Giles, 2013, et al.) have considered Foucaults remark about biopolitics as 
the power to ‘make live’ and ‘let die’’ (Foucault, M. 2003) paramount in their studies of contem-
porary homelessness. For example, Beckett & Herbert write that banishment is a ‘punishment, me-
ted out to those condemned as deviant or criminal. The practices that entail banishment rest on 
the assumption that the social problems to which they are frequently a response—homelessness, 
addiction, mental illness—may be understood and treated as criminal problems.’ (2010, p.11). 
According to Boarder Giles governmental policies are responsible for creating homelessness.3536 
(Boarder Giles, 2013. P.123). Arnold mentions in a similar fashion that the ‘forces that homeless 
people deal with are disenfranchisement and social “death”: degrading myths and stereotypes, 
punitive treatment by caseworkers, deficient school systems that perpetuate illiteracy and jobless-
ness’ (Arnold, K. 2004. P.13). ‘There have been efforts to banish the homeless through antiloitering 
34‘It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States. As 
a result, the modern State can scarcely function without becoming involved with racism at some point. (…) What in fact
is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break 
between what must live and what must die. (…) When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at 
least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that 
allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism 
alone can justify the murderous function of the State. (Foucault, M. p. 254 & p. 256.) 
35 ‘Homelessness, hunger, and survival itself are not only, in a sense, created by these policies. (Boarder Giles, 2013. 
P.123).
36 Boarder Giles describes not solely the criminalization of homelessness but even the criminalization of care (italics by
author) by writing about citizen groups supporting homeless people by organizing informal food distrubution 
networks.
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and vagrancy laws (abridges the right to freedom of movement), place homeless people in a dou-
ble bind by arresting them for sleeping in public when they have nowhere else to go (cruel and unu-
sual punishment) and to take away means of survival through seizure of property (violations of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments).’ (Arnold, K. P.109). Beckett mentioned that the harsh restrictive and
disciplining policies are a result of the incapability to deal more effective with homeless people. 
(Beckett & Herbert, 2010).37 I quote here extensively to indicate that the notion of the Foucault’s 
notion of the disallowance of life, not at least of citizens rights, are valid and relevant in regard of 
various U.S.´ anti-homelessness policies. For example, Craig Willse has written extensively about 
biopolitics and homelessness.38 According to Willse homelessness is ‘caused fundamentally by 
poverty and lack of affordable housing’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.168). He blames neo-liberal arrange-
ments for reconfiguring housing insecurity and considers that a productive force within neolibera-
lism. (Willse, C. 2010). Willse comments that initiatives to relief chronic homelessness do nothing 
to alter ‘the structural conditions that produce housing insecurity and deprivation.’39 (Ibid.). He 
considers neoliberal social programmes for example as economic ventures with ends in themselves
whom are profiting by not ending social problems.40 (Willse, C. 2010). Though this statement could
37  Civil liberties are under pressure in a biopolitical system and the behavior of deviants, often people unproductive in 
an economic paradigm, are considered, probably increasingly, as criminal. Margier (2016) and Boarder Giles refer to a 
focus of policymakers from ‘“the” public to whom they’re responsible (to) a market-public, and define public needs and 
priorities in ways that exclude homeless and economically marginalised people.’ (Boarder Giles, 2013. P. 28). ‘These 
policies need to be understood, too, on a larger scale. Like homelessness itself, they represent transformations in the 
fabric of urban living which have been both cause and effect throughout these vexed decades of political and economic
(neo)-liberalisation.’ (Boarder Giles, 2013. P. 123).
38 See: Universal Data Elements;’ Or the Biopolitical life of Homeless Populations (2008), Neo-liberal Biopolitics and the 
Invention of Chronic Homelessness (2010), Beyond Biopolitics; Essays on the Governance of Life and Death (2011)  & 
The Value of Homelessness; Managing Surplus Life In the United States. (2015).
39 (I)nadequate ‘’safety net’’ programs’ (...) force individuals to rely on emergency shelter systems. It does not go as far
as advocating structural changes that might slow or end the reproduction of housing insecurity for example, 
challenging discriminatory renting practices.’’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.169).
40 Willse applies on numerous occasions Foucault’s biopolitical notion of ‘fostering life and letting die; ‘Foucault argues
that a form of racism allows for death in biopolitics, the death of some populations that are marked as inferior and 
harmful to the larger body of the nation.’ (Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.50,51). ‘For Foucault, death, through 
state racism, makes life because it eliminates that which would sap the population of its strength and vitality; it is a 
cutting- out of loss and negation. But understanding death, the production of death and the management of death as 
economic activities suggests that that which is ill or dying does not need to be eliminated to grant biopolitical life to a 
population. The activity of dying, of being ill, offers economic life and productivity, as a matter to be neo-liberally and 
biopolitically managed. As the invention of chronic homelessness makes clear, welfare policy and administration, 
viewed as technologies of biopower operating within economic contexts, may invest in life and health as objects of 
governance without challenging the conditions that reproduce and distribute illness and exposure to premature death. 
In the neo- liberal context, economic activity and biopolitical death grow side by side.’  (Willse, C. 2010. P.180). 
I find the idea of biopolitics as ‘letting die’, or even to disinvest in life not relevant for my research, as my 
problem is more the nagging persistence to be included in a regime of care in order to be (part of society), instead of 
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be further scrutinized in itself, in The Netherlands for-profit social programmes working with 
homeless people are non-existent.41 In Willse’s studies structuralistic descriptions prevail, such as 
economic, political and social structures, whereas individual agency (‘life skills’) related problems 
are underexposed:42 Willse implies even that there would not be homelessness without the struc-
tural biopolitical racism, and that homeless people are able to self-manage their life without the 
neo-liberal neglect and disinvestment. (Ibid.). Willse states that ‘at a discursive level chronic home-
lessness evokes addiction and hence individual behaviour and personal attributes.’ (2010. P.171). I 
am more inclined to consider homelessness as a multifaceted, and mostly very complex problem. 
As such there is no clear and uniform direction for any responsibility to be adressed. 
§ 1.5.3 a nuance which describes a problem as more complex
After Foucault’s elaboration of racism where he describes the homi- and suicidical tendencies of 
Nazi Germany, Foucault nuanced himself that such extreme biopolitical tendencies do ‘perhaps 
(not apply) in all states’.43 (Foucault, M. 2003. P.261). At least in the described policies in regard of 
homelessness in The Netherlands the problem is not about people whom are let to die: The biopo-
litical (and hence practical) problem in northern European (rudimentary-)welfare states is about 
how to ‘include’ the ‘marginal’. This aim to ‘include’ could serve as a totalizing power to the point 
there may and can not exist any ‘rogues’, ‘misfits’ or ‘misplaced’ people if we bare in mind that in 
order to have biopolitical power there should be control over whole populations.44 (Foucault, 
2003). We have witnessed in the former paragraph (§1.5.2) that there has been an excess of, most-
ly U.S.’ descriptions which support a Foucaultian biopolitical neglect of (citizen) life to the point of 
neglect. As well Willse is paying considerable attention to race, in the sense of skincolour, relations, and he implies 
housing deprivation is a racist tool to disadvantage black communities. I will not deny racism in The Netherlands, but 
the housing market is not that racially segregated as for example in the U.S.A.
41 I mention this explicitly because I think it depends on a local context what kind of policies are applied (or lacking). I 
reckon hence that a description of more grim U.S. environments are not that illustrative for northern European 
practices.  However, I would like to stress again that the U.S. environments are rather different than Rhinelandic or 
Scandinavian social policies.
42 Bhugra mentioned we ought to resis a single explanation for homelessness; I underwrite that command. 
On page 32, I will refer to the substance abuse often associated with homeless people. However, if we 
postpone Willse conviction that people are homeless because of structural conditions, we might as well consider that 
because of substance abuse people might have lost their dwelling. In other words, such an invariable stance denies a 
certain chicken-or-egg problem. I am sceptical to make a hard choice between structure or agency approach, but I find 
Willse’s sided and unbalanced description of homelessness  rather naive and as well prejudiced. It leaves an 
impression Willse aims to prove that the U.S. policies battling homeless reveal a certain structural political unwill, as if 
the people are made homeless by default. This leaves an impression that Willse’s political agenda prevails in his 
writing, or at least causes a particular radical bias.
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death. There is as well literature, usually not coined as biopolitical though, which claims not all so-
cial policies to relief homeless are ‘uniformly hostile (...), and argue that some of them are in fact 
supportive of homeless people. (Some cities have taken) a positive approach to reducing homeless-
ness by providing appropriate housing and support as an alternative to life on the streets’ (...). This 
demonstrates how urban homeless policy is “rarely entirely – or even wholly – punitive.” (Margier, 
A. P.64. 2016). Instead of letting somebody perish to death, the problem seems, at least to me, 
considering my past workexperience in a Dutch homelesshelter, not so much how to turn proble-
matic lifes of homeless, drunkards, addicts, mentally ill and petty criminals into productice life, but 
how to deal with the stress of about on the hand the impossibility to control - to have power over 
deviants45 - and on the other hand the civilian and (bio-)political taboo to let people perish (to 
death). The local Dutch practice in §1.6 and §1.7 will be considered as a biopolitical problem, but 
not as a problem of abandonment (which extreme is disinvestment to the point of death).
§ 1.5.4 neoliberal biopolitics; what it means on a personal level
The contemporary western political system is neoliberal post-political biopolitics. (Žižek, 2008). It is
the time where biopolitics became dominant. (Willse, 2008). In the second part of this paragraph I 
will connect neoliberal post-political disciplining of individuals. 
Neoliberalism enhances a paradoxical form of governmentality46; it namely appears to go-
vern without governing.47 'Neoliberalism is (…) the paradigm of governmental reason: it is a way of
understanding political rule and the regulation of the general conduct of individuals in a manner 
43 We will not state that Foucault’s take on racism is false or outdated universally, think for example of Achille Mbembe
(2003) insights on necropolitics or the dire situations of illegal immigrants and their perpetual non-citizenship status, 
or people perishing away in the numerous violent conflicts in the world. 
44 See as well footnote 7 on Finlands ‘house first’ policy. 
45 Another reason for disagreement between the author and Willse is the latter’s statement that for ‘municipalities, 
chronic homelessness programmes became a way of containing an unruly social problem that has not been made to 
disappear by decades of social and political abandonment.‘ (Willse, C. 2010. P.174). In my experiences as worker in a 
shelter for homeless people, we, the workers at the shelter, had virtually no power to actually ‘tame’ unruly people. At
least the shelter where I have worked had very little power over the peoples behavior and whereabouts.
46 Governmentality refers to 'the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, and to the creation of an analytical 
grid for assessing the efficacy of this conduct.' (Foucault, 2008. P.186). 
47 Foucault considers neoliberalism ‘as a specific art of governing human beings.´ (Lemke, 2011. P.45). 'The new art of 
government (…) appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: 'be free', with the 
immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain. Neoliberalism operates on interests, desires, and 
aspirations; (...) it acts on the conditions of actions. This trajectory follows a fundamental paradox; as power becomes 
less restrictive, less corporeal, it also becomes more intense, saturating the field of actions.'' (Read, 2009. P.29).
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whereby everything would be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the need for 
intervention.' (McNay, 2009. P.57). Foucault describes neoliberal governmental concern to interve-
ne in all layers of [societies].48 (Foucault, 2013). It is relevant to consider that neoliberalism is not a 
laissez-faire style of government as there are perpetually interventions and policies implemented 
to enhance neoliberalism.49 (Ibid.). Foucault mentioned ‘that from the sociological point of view 
(neoliberalism) is just a way of establishing strictly market relations in society.’ (Foucault, M. 2008. 
P.130). The homo oeconomicus is the designated outcome of neoliberal post-political biopolitics. 
The homo oeconomicus is described by Foucault as an individual whom is entrepreneurial and 
hence productive.50 (Foucault, 2004). “(T)he kind of network of intelligibility of his behavior is eco-
nomic behavior. ...[T]he individual becomes governmentalizable, that power gets a hold on him to 
the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a homo oeconomicus.” (Foucault, M. 2008. P. 252). A 
relevant development regarding homeless people is that there are ample institutions to support 
these people to become homo oeconomici; productive (that means, self-sufficient) ‘members of 
[society].´ Slogans such as ‘learn to participate’ are commonly applied in the neoliberal 
Netherlands: there are for example organizations working to empower informal care networks.51 
Though contemporary popular conceptions often have it people were being cared for in the wel-
fare state of the 1970s and 1980s, which might be disputed by the way52 (Schinkel 2008), since the 
1990s increasingly the focus to be(-come) productive as individual has come to the fore. In the 
next chapter I will question from an ethical and pragmatic point of view if one ought to ask people 
48 Foucault mentions that ‘technical, scientific, juridical and demographic, in general social, factors to be the object of 
governmental intervention.’ (Foucault, M. P.190. 2013).
49 ‘Neoliberal governmental interventions are thus not less intense, less frequent, less active and less a continuity than 
in any other (political or economic) system.’ (Foucault, M. 2013. P.145 & Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011). 
50 Individuals had to become entrepreneurial because the welfare states have been dismantled, or to use a more 
contemporary term; ‘deregulated’. (Lemke, 2011). Foucault describes this development poignantly: ‘So, what does this 
sociological government want to do in relation to this society that has now become the object of governmental 
intervention and practice? It wants, of course, to make the market possible. (…) This means that what is sought is not a
society subject to the commodity- effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket 
society, but an enterprise society. The homo œconomicus sought after is not the man of exchange or man the 
consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production.’ (Foucault, M. 2008. P.146, 147). ‘Homo œconomicus is an 
entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is true to the extent that, in practice, the stake in all neoliberal analyses 
is the replacement every time of homo œconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo œconomicus as entrepreneur 
of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] 
earnings. (Foucault, M. 2008. P. 226).
51 See for example the webpage of the ‘Inclusion lab’: http://www.inclusionlab.nl/?p=168.
52 We will not participate in that discussion here though.
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to be entrepreneurial if they lack such skills.
Foucault’s timely analysis foresaw individualising53 (self-)control (1977). The internalization 
of that would develop into a different, advanced sort of technique, namely ‘‘(f)ree-floating control 
that replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system.54 (Deleuze, 1992. 
P.5). A ‘society of control’ is an open environment where every position of any element is known 
and where control leads to modulation.55 (Deleuze, 1992). Think for example of various smart-
phone apps which record work productivity, diet, sleep, and physical health and exercise; The com-
monness of such apps demonstrate the normality of productivity and physical self-discipline. The 
usage of self-surveillance techology is rbeing rewarded; service goes faster (for example on an air-
port in case you check in yourself) or one gets discounts using a loyalty program or customer card. 
(Schneier, B. 2015). It is more productive to reward than to punish. ‘This abstract space of capita-
lism produces a form of social-spatial politics which hides its own operations of power under a 
cloak of transparency, visibility and openness.’ (Dale, K. & B. Burrel. 2008. P.16). The body became 
only useful when it is productive ánd subjective. In order to be productive - think again for example
of the public transport chipcard - and to move swiftly between places one is subjugated to a histo-
rically speaking unparalleled and sophisticated total surveillance system. The contemporary digital 
environments, think of platforms such as facebook, linked-in and the spectrum of google-products,
which are indispensable in contemporary life to ‘maintain’ a social network are essentially data col-
lection techniques where you receive a free service in return for your information. (Schneier, B. 
2015). These technologies are characterized by their elegance. (Foucault, M. 1985). Contemporary 
styles of governance are sophisticated and subtile, but can nevertheless be physical, think of the 
public transport chipcard for example. Deleuze mentioned the ‘societies of control’ are a recent 
invention and that is possible humanity will experience a revival of earlier notions of government, 
53 Individualization, ‘discovered’ in disciplinary regimes are an essential part of biopolitical governance.
54 ‘Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they reach their height at the 
outset of the twentieth. They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing 
from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws. (Deleuze, 1992. P.3).
‘These mechanisms do not tend to a nullification of phenomena in the form of the prohibition, “you will not do
this,” nor even, “this will not happen,” but in the form of a progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the 
phenomena themselves. In a way, they involve the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than the
imposition of a law that says no to them. So mechanisms of security are not put to work on the sovereign-subjects axis 
or in the form of the prohibition.’ (Foucault, M. 1977. P.93).
55 ‘(W)hat counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a 
universal modulation.’ (Deleuze, 1992. P.6).
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for example the techniques of discipline or the application of a sovereign. (Deleuze, 1992). In case 
the implicit command to be an entrepeneur of ones life project does not lead to a productive life, 
Foucaults earlier researched disciplinary and even punishing techniques are still applicable (Willse, 
G. 2008): like the homeless visitors of the shelter someone can still become an object in prohibi-
ting medical, penal and scientific regimes.5657 Biopower has ‘two poles: the signature that designa-
tes the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position 
within a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, 
and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those 
over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body.
(…) Individuals have become ‘dividuals’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or banks.’’ (Deleuze, 
1992. P.5).
Žižek considers neoliberalism as post-political biopolitics. (2008). It appears initially odd 
how a political system can be post-political; how could a political system have ceased to be politi-
cal? Post- implies that the former ideologies are passé. According to Schinkel there is a lacunae of 
real politics in post-political biopolitics: contemporary political debates lack real different point of 
views and real political ideas; what is left is management - governance without ideology.58 
(Schinkel, 2008). The biopolitical means the regulation of safety and wellbeing of people as prima-
ry goal of [society]. In case you do not have any ideology other than well-being - case there lacks 
56 ‘Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the 
population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which 
the organization of power over life was deployed.’ (Foucault, M. 1978. p.139). Bigo coined the term banopticon ‘to 
describe a situation where profiling technologies are used to determine who to place under surveillance.’ (Fierke, 
2007. P.183).
57 See for example: ‘To capture the sense of a field of data as I describe requires looking to what Foucault called the 
other pole of biopower, biopolitics. Disciplinary management, including the psychodynamic model of case 
management in social work, describes those techniques of power organized through disciplinary enclosures and 
directed at the human subject, the body and soul of that subject, and its relationship to other subjects in space. 
Biopolitics, on the other hand, seeks to regulate the social or collective processes of life, death and productivity across 
a population (Foucault, 1978:139; See also Foucault, 2003:239-264). Together, discipline and biopolitics function to 
bring biological objects and processes into political and economic calculation; discipline does so by addressing the 
animal body of individualized man whereas biopolitics does so by addressing the species body of the total population.’ 
(Willse, G. 2008. P. 243).
58Žižek writes that ‘‘the post-political’ is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, 
focus on expert management and (social) administration, while ‘biopolitics’ designates the regulation of the security 
and welfare of human lives as its primary goal. It is clear how these two dimensions overlap: once one renounces big 
ideological causes, what remains is only the efficient administration of life. (Žižek, 2008. P.41).
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positive ideology59 and meaning became a private matter - in a political system, fear will be only 
and solely mobilising element in our political systems.60 For example fear for maladjustment in 
regard of religion, race or social class. ‘As a result, notions of subjectivity shift, where being a 
subject is recognized only in terms of being a “good” citizen and the punishment of those who are 
not considered good citizens: all forms of life that are not “organized on the basis of market va-
lues” then become “characterized as a potential security risk’’’ (Povinelli, 2009. P.22). Our [socie-
ties] have developed into what Schinkel has described as ‘social hypochondric societies’; our [socie-
ties] are obsessively focusing on potential, but imaginaned, illnesses in the ‘societal body’. 
(Schinkel, 2008). Instead of repression of criminal and illicit behavior after an illicit act, nowadays 
there is a tendency developing towards ‘prepression’ - a combination of prevention and repres-
sion; before a possible wrongdoing can be committed, it will be already prevented or sanctioned. 
(Schinkel, 2012). Whom is obsessed with safety is perpetually busy to chart risks in order to restrict
those. The attention shifts from a focus after an event to before something happens.61 The to be 
disputed idea that all misery can be banned leads to further interventions in the private and legal 
spheres of people. Secondly, in case one is not an homo oeconimicus one will become an object in 
an expert regime in which one is either (re-)educated, trained, disciplined or in the last resort puni-
shed: One ought to [re-integrate] by doing work, education, rehabilitation therapy or confinement.
Foucault begged for an awareness for miscegenation between health care and the legal sectors. 
59 There is not much what can ‘unite’ in contemporary [societies], but there is consensus about what is terrible. To 
think in an utopian way is out of fashion, to think dystopian is in vogue. (Schinkel, 2005).
60 Since contemporary spheres are depoliticized, the only way people can nowadays become enthousiastic for the 
professional coordination and management seems to be the a-political realm of fear. Fear constitutes as core-concept 
of the contemporary subjectivity. That is why biopolitics is politics of fear; she is just there to protect the general well-
being according to Žižek. (Žižek, S. 2009). Žižeks continues: ‘what remains is only the efficient administration of life. … 
almost only that. That is to say, with the depoliticised, socially objective, expert administration and coordination of 
interests as the zero level of politics, the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilise people, is 
through fear, a basic constituent of today’s subjectivity. (Žižek, 2008. P.41). Žižek elaborates further on the aspect of 
fear as: ‘biopolitics is ultimately a politics of fear, it focuses on defence from potential victimisation or harassment. This 
is what separates a radical emancipatory politics from our political status quo. We’re talking here (...) about the 
difference between politics based on a set of universal axioms and a politics which renounces the very constitutive 
dimension of the political, since it resorts to fear as its ultimate mobilising principle: fear of immigrants, fear of crime, 
fear of godless sexual depravity, fear of the excessive state itself, with its burden of high taxation, fear of ecological 
catastrophe, fear of harassment. Political correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the politics of fear. Such a 
(post-)politics always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid ochlos or multitude: it is the frightening rallying of 
frightened people.” (Žižek, 2008. P.42).
61 For example the Netherlands police is piloting a so called ‘Crime Anticipation System’ based on ‘big data’. Source: 
http://nltimes.nl/2017/05/15/dutch-police-use-big-data-predict-crime-manage-resources, consulted 18.05.2017.
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(1989).62 ‘(A)n extralegal administrative discourse has turned the legitimacy of governance over to 
technical systems of compliance and efficiency that underwrite the relationship of the state and the
economy with a biopolitics of (...) and surveillance.’ (Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.1). A 
certain freedom, for example to deviate from certain norms regarding productivity, physical and 
mental health, and a certain deviation from acceptable norms regarding religious or political 
beliefs or physical presence in some physical and online spaces are restricted in postpolitical neoli-
beralism. According to Schinkel democracies should reconcile with the fact that terrible events can 
and will occur. (Schinkel, 2012). And likewise that some people, in fact a small minority, are devi-
ant. That is the idea of freedom: freedom means that people deviate from norms. (Ibid). To tackle 
risk there is an increasing call for surveillance. Hence people are increasingly monitored and in-
fluenced. Dillon and Reid consider that the ‘‘reduction of the human to the biohuman’ implies that 
‘ the subject of rights is reduced to the object of regulatory rule’, in other words to ‘information 
and code’.’’ (Chandler, 2010. P.89,91). Through technological development ubiquitous surveillance 
is cheap and possible, but humanity is facing a paradoxical situation of an information-overload: 
how to filter the exponentially increasing amount of data meaning- and carefully?63 (Schneier, B. 
2015).
We assume a comprehensive biopolitical study only works if considered how individuals 
and systems are producing each other. In fact, I should consider that [society] and individual are 
not separate identities: Namely can you be an ‘dividual’ if not part of [society]?64  (Deleuze, 1992). I
62 Foucault writes that every ‘crime or every offense bears the possibility of insanity. The law does not solely judge; she 
implies a conception of normativity and a technical prescription for possible normalisation. (…) During the criminal trial
and the penitential implementation appurterent institutions are abound. About the main verdict of a judge manifold 
smaller juridical authorities and parallel functioning judges: specialist pyschologist and psychiatrist, civil servants, (…) 
educators, penitentiary officials. They cut into bits the legal power to punish, they are assistant judges.’  (Foucault, M. 
1989. P.34).  Arnold mentions as well that ‘(d)elinquency, anomalies, deviations, potential dangers, illness, and this 
form of existence must be accounted for in formulating policy and prescription. The entire extrajuridical web supports 
the functioning of the norm and the body of knowledge generated on this basis evidences the denaturing of the power 
that authorities exercise. The rules and laws set up around assessing each client or case function as a normative power.
Discipline hierarchizes, individualizes, and categorizes.It subscribes to a binary mode (good/bad, 
deserving/undeserving) and the contemporary version of branding (through documentation, the transformation of 
each individual into a case, and fingerprinting, for example). Knowledge is generated from the combination of this 
power that infiltrates society and penality on all levels and involves the individ- ual as a subject to be investigated, the 
effectiveness of the power wielded, and the social or human sciences that support disciplinary power.’  (Arnold, K. 2004. 
P.107).
63 In paragraph 2.3  I will illustrate this problem using an allegory of Kafkas story of the Chinese wall.
64 See as well Foucault: ‘Let’s now take discipline. I think it is indisputable, or hardly disputable, that discipline 
normalizes. Again we must be clear about the specificity of disciplinary normalization. (...) Discipline (...) analyzes and 
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will elaborate on this in insight in the next chapter applying Derrida’s ‘Rogues’.
§ 1.5.5 the complexity of contextualizing
This subparagraph will explain more about homelessness from various angles: a historical study 
covering the last century of homelessness in the United States (DePastino, 2003), a book on per-
sonal experiences and motivation for ‘on the ground’ social work to relieve homeless people 
(Steele, 2012) and lastly a study which focuses particularly on the interconnectedness between 
homelessness and mental health. (Bhugra, 2007). The reviewed books made clear there is a persis-
tent problem in regard of the description of homelessness, namely how to localize or spatialize it?
DePastino mentions for example in the introduction of his historical study on hobos in the 
United States that the ‘first step of such an investigation is (...) plotting the boundaries (...) and 
analyzing the politics of a way of life largely forgotten by historians and obscured by contemporary 
assumptions and concerns.’ (DePastino. 2003. xx). I find DePastinos expression ‘plotting the boun-
daries’ particularly puzzling because hobos are seemingly fluid and elusive, so why the stress – or 
the possibility - to ‘plot the boundaries’, and how to do so? (Ibid.). DePastino mentions that ‘hobos 
almost always defined their world in terms not only of class, but also of race, ethnicity, gender, and
region.’ (Ibid.) DePastino refers throughout his book to the concern to describe hobos more nuan-
ced and diverse than just as an exponent of a class struggle or as a concern of white heterosexual 
males only, but besides that intention DePastino does not consider or refers to methodological is-
sues - ‘how to plot the boundaries’ - in his further insightful historical study on hoboism. (2003).
Danielle Steele’s ‘A gift of hope: Helping the homeless’ is - possibly non unintentially65 - mostly a 
book about the personal experiences of the author as volunteer social worker. It is written in a mo-
tivational style and the author is blending religious beliefs and ditto motivations throughout the 
book. Steele’s personal experiences explain why for some people it is rather difficult to have a pro-
breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and operations. It breaks them down into 
components such that they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other. It is this famous disciplinary, 
analytical-practical grid that tries to establish the minimal elements of perception and the elements sufficient for 
modification. Second, discipline classifies the components thus identified according to definite objectives.’ (Foucault, M.
1977. P.84).
65 A common characteristic of the field of social work is described by Steel; namely that the homeless people 
eventually stay alien to a social worker. Steel describes how hard it is to build a relation of trust with the people living 
on the streets, a prerequisite in order to get to know the homeless people well. To my opinion the fallacy of the book is
that instead of writing about the difficulties to describe homeless people Steele covers the lacuna by writing more 
about herself – her persnoal motivations and religious beliefs -  than about the initial topic of the book.
29
ductive66 lifestyle. I admire Steele’s activism and her description of a destitution of imagination and
lack of practical common sense in some social policies, for example when municipalities are trea-
ting symptoms instead of causes: Steele dislikes policies to expel homeless people from municipali-
ties by forcing them with a one way ticket out of an area.67 68 As well she describes lively the diffi-
cult burocratic processes homeless people are facing.69 (Steele, 2012). What I consider most rele-
vant to enunciate for the forthcoming research is that Steele seems undetermined regarding her 
description on [society]: on the one hand she does not assume that [societies] are a coherent or 
perfect (domain). However elsewhere in her book Steele claims that most ‘of the homeless are 
there because they cannot function in our society’. (Steele, 2012. P. 109). I want to stress it is like-
wise possible to describe that ‘our [society]’ cannot function either with the homeless ((or with 
other ‘problematic’ people, like (illegal) immigrants)). And whose, or which [society] is it anyways? 
The problem is: [society] cannot observe itself in a neutral fashion. (Schinkel, 2007). Steele applies 
66 Obviously ‘productive’ is a very normalizing term: with that I mean a lifestyle in which one can earn an income and
take care of oneself, and ideally as well perform caring tasks to family and others.
67“Informed sources say that one of New York’s best tools to deal with the homeless are bus tickets to New Jersey. 
Likewise, at one time San Francisco had a program to give them bus tickets to anywhere but here. Just get them out! 
It’s a modern-day version of the pea-under-the-shell game. Just move it around to somewhere else, and hide it there. 
(Steel, 2012. P. 93).
68A similar expulsion policy has been applied in Utrecht during my worktime in the homeless’ shelter. ‘Since the start 
of the project the disruption of public order caused by the homeless Middle and Eastern Europeans significantly 
decreased. Barka helps to encourage them to look for jobs or to go back to the country of origin.’  Source: 
http://www.barkauk.org/news/volkskrant-polish-organization-helps-homeless-in-utrecht/, consulted on 04.05.2017. 
Though the positive tone of the newspaper article, as far as I am aware nobody has researched the long-term 
feasibility of this expulsion with one way bustickets to Poland. The experiences of the people working at the shelter are
that many ‘exported’ Polish men were within a week back to the city they were expeled from. Only the ‘export’ of the 
homeless people went into the municipal statistics though. Willse writes that ‘(f)or agencies, making their numbers 
“get better”—not necessarily their clients—will draw in more money.’ (Willse, G. 2008. P. 246).
69‘’Civic leaders in every city find homeless people lingering on the streets and in doorways an embarrassment. They 
want them to go away. Merchants complain that the homeless interfere with business. And there are programs in 
every city designed to assist them to get off the streets, or so they say. But in truth only the most functional among the 
homeless are able to access those programs. Lines are endless, forms are impossible to decipher, qualifications can’t be
met, standards don’t apply. Waiting lists for every kind of facility keep people on hold for months for medical care, 
detox programs, housing. Some waits are as long as a year, while those on the lists grow despondent, get sicker and 
more desperate, or die. Funding is being slashed and eliminated at and “helps them. Those were the people we looked 
for when we did outreach on the streets: the ones who couldn’t get to free dining rooms, and the many who were often
justifiably afraid of shelters, or too disturbed to be allowed to enter them, and had no idea how to fill out forms to 
access help. They are the truly forgotten people of the streets, and the ones in greatest need. If we don’t reach out to 
them, who will? Almost no one does. (…)
I don’t know about you, but going to the DMV gives me the vapors, standing in line at a department store 
makes me hysterical, and looking at a six-page form of any kind makes me feel brain dead. How is someone who is 
already in dire straits and often disoriented supposed to access help in a system where even trying to reach someone 
by phone puts you in cyberhell? Today calling a doctor, an insurance company, the post office, a passport agency, an 
airline, or even local information is a nightmare. How are people who are already in shaky shape supposed to deal with
that? They don’t. They just give up. […]” (Steel, 2012. P. 93, 94).
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[society] in a gliding scale or at least loosely, sometimes as something one should want to be part 
of but as well as an intolerant excluding mechanism and sometimes as the sum of all people and all
their problems in a certain geographical place. I point this inconsistency out in Steele’s book but I 
have noticed the volatile use of the word rather frequently throughout my research, even by social 
scientists. Maybe because of the volatility of [society] it is so often applied in contemporary politi-
cal discourses? The volatility of the oft-applied word is a motivation for my research.
Dinesh Bhugra’s ‘Homelessness and Mental Health’ (2007) describes the difficulty how to 
organize appropriate care for homeless people because of the multiple problems homeless people 
and relating institutions are facing. ‘The homeless have complex and interrelated needs including 
food, housing, help for physical and psychological health problems and for substance misuse’ 
(Bhugra, 2007. p.100). ‘Homelessness and Mental health’ has ample attention for the complexity70 
of homelessness, mental health care, criminal law and the penal system and social geographic 
changes, for example gentrification, in cities. Throughout the book the description of homeless-
ness is discussed and problematized, for example the difficulty to apply a holistic definition and the
difficulty to classify homeless.71 What I find particularly outstanding in relation to the forthcoming 
study is that - regardless that Bhugra takes into account the difficulty to describe complex matter, 
graphs, matrixes and ‘objectifying’ knowledge72 are nevertheless applied. In other words, on the 
one hand Bhugra seems to request mildness to acknowledge a certain methodological elusiveness 
but on the other hand the researchers continues after the initial methodologic dubiousness in a 
modern and contemporary ‘evidence-based’ fashion. How is it methodologically possible to 
reconcile these apparent differences in style between modern and critical science? Why admit 
there should be a methodological or epistemological modesty but nevertheless proceed with such 
70 ‘Complexus is that what is composed, a collage of various elements which appear inseparable. Complexity is the 
tissue of events and actions, interactions, counteractions, provisions and chances which form our observable world. In 
other words ‘complexitythinking’ includes an investigative attitude how order, certainty and security are constructed, 
how ambiguity is expelled, how things are clarified, distinguished and hierarchized. By interventions necessary for 
reasonability and comprehensibility the risk occurs that some aspects of the complexus are reduced or dispelled, what 
could cause, metaphorically put, near-sighted or even blindness. Complexity thinking aims to include considerations 
and politics in regard of reduction.’ (Morin, 2008 in Nieuwenhuizen, 2015).
71 ‘(D)efinitions of homelessness vary as do housing conditions (...), which makes direct comparisons on the level of 
homelessness difficult. The relationship of poor housing, available housing at affordable costs, unemployment and 
increasing rates of repossession due to economic factors on the one hand and on the other hand mental illness 
resulting from all these factors and often leading to loss of' home' turns into a vicious spiral. (Bhugra, 2007. P.3).
72 For various reasons, critically but as well pragmatically, I will refrain from doing a research with aims for ‘objective’ 
knowledge.
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knowledge production? May I reduce complexity just to the graphic descriptions as applied in 
Bhugra’s book? Or is a fact- and method based modern, with which I mean an empiristic, positivis-
tic and application oriented approach to be problematized?73 (Evans, B. 2015) ‘Homelessness and 
Mental Health’ does not engage with a critical research into its own method.
The problem to spatialize the complex homelessness in [societies] is distinctively mentio-
ned by DePastino Steele and Bhugra.74 The authors recognize the complexity and difficulty to des-
cribe homelessness, but after initial observations of this problem the authors continue neverthe-
less with their story or research: These studies lack a critical philosophical perspective.
Initially I intended to describe in the literature review ‘the’ context of this research, as that 
virtue is commonplace in an inquiry. But before long it became clear it is very difficult to describe a
context without affirming it as a descriptive or even as prescriptive. I ought to research if there 
actually exist a common place, in other words context, before anything else, like a common that 
surround something, a space ‘in which something occurs’ (as environment or setting) which can 
clarify the functioning of [society].75 If I do not question [society] in which homelessness apparent-
ly by default occurs the risk exists I accept [it]  as rigid discourse of which I cannot deviate after its 
performative confirmation.76 In other words; the spaces in which homelessness occurs will be pro-
blematized and therefore the application of the common descriptive word has to be terminated. I 
do not deny the social though, but I consider it as de facto as various and multiple spheres. Arnold 
states that if biopoltical cases are described, usually the focus is on ‘problemcases’, such as home-
less people, and that academics and policymakers are usually not investigated in these casuistry; 
‘(T)he politics of homelessness is a larger problem that reflects upon our society and the status of 
democracy rather than being a mere policy issue.’ (Arnold, K. 2004. P.13). There are practical con-
73‘This is a discourse that enshrines data, correlations, and performance, while eschewing matters of substance, social 
problems, and power.’ (Evans, B. 2015).
74 Bhugra’s insights on homelessness and mental health will be mentioned on page 21 which deals particularly with 
this issue.
75 Context means ‘1. The parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning, or 
2. The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs:  environment, setting.’ Source: 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/context, consulted on 08.05.2017.
76 The consulted applied literature in this paragraph, namely the texts of Phelan & Link (1999), Clough Marinaro 
(2009), Beckett & Herbert (2010), Sorenson (2013), Hennigan (2013) and  Boarder Giles (2013) all mention [society] as 
an uncritically and as uncontested concept, and as such confirm a certain biopolitical frame of prevailing a body-as-
whole.
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cerns, for example mentioned stigmatization77 which works counterproductive in a biopolitical 
sense.
§ 1.6 about inept contemporary survival skills & criminalization of homelessness78
During my master studies in The Netherlands I have been working in a shelter79 for homeless80 
people near the medieval Dom tower in the city center of Utrecht. This shelter is a dayshelter; the 
people visiting the place sleep either outdoors or at various nightshelters. As well people whom 
‘have a roof above their head’81 spend time in the ‘livingroom’ as it is dubbed as most homeless 
people lack a social network outside of the fellow homeless people and sometimes some befrien-
ded caretakers. The origins of the shelter lay in pastoral streetwork - the organization has a protes-
tant denomination - and as well receives part of its funding through religious charities. In it’s day to
day practice there is not a missionary agenda though, but because of it’s religious denomination 
this organization has a certain independence to various governmental bodies, such as the munici-
pality and the municipal health care. This is relevant, because ‘neutral’ scientific based modern 
organizations, such as municipal healthcare. A caring organization with a religious denomination 
has some agility to leverage biopolitical tendencies, and counter these with a religious – ethical 
agenda. As well, the shelter where I worked was just what it is, namely a shelter: A place to ‘hide’ 
so to say. This organization main focus, although not against it either and willing to provide longer 
term and structural support, was for the visitors there to provide a breathing space. Arnold 
mentions that many ‘shelters and agencies go beyond simple admonitions, however, and issue 
ultimatums. Some are contradictory and put the homeless in a double bind. Indeed, the system 
that helps them can often be erratic, disorganized, and pathological. Of course, these terms are 
often reserved for the homeless, not “us.”’ (Arnold, K.R. 2004. P.2). Such a tendency where a caring 
77 ‘Banishment is also counterproductive because it imperils efforts by the socially marginal to integrate with 
mainstream society.’ (Beckett & Herbert. 2010, p.17).
78 This chapter has been written before studying key texts from Foucault about biopolitics, but that the the 
theoretical naïvity illustrates biopolitical tendencies from practice based experience. 
79 The shelter is called the ‘Catharijnehuis’, which translates as Catherine’s house or Catherine’s place.  It’s webpage is: 
http://www.catharijnehuis.nl/, consulted on 30.03.2017.
80 Bhugra mentions there is no clear cut definition of homelessness: ‘It emerges that there remains no single 
consensual definition of homelessness and that any definition will lie somewhere on a spectrum between 'not 
deliberately roofless' to 'all roofless and all those resident in bad housing'. It is important to bear this debate in mind 
while assessing any models of homelessness.’ (Bhugra, D. 2007. P.27).
81 Often only for a short time though, because many people visiting the shelter are inable to pay their bills or they 
cause disturbance in their new street. 
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organization ‘shoots itself in their foot’ by being idealistic and soft, and on the other hand get 
disentangled in a biopolitical surveillance regime. That might explain why many homeless get 
disillusioned with for example mental-, health- and financial care. 
The shelter is frequented by people of a diverse background; people born in Utrecht and as 
well other ‘native’ Dutch people, by people from other parts of Europe, for example by relatively 
many Polish men and moreover by people from other parts of the world, for example by people 
from north- and sub-Sahara Africa. Illegal immigrants - people without the right to be in the 
European Union - are among the people visiting the shelter. Most of the homeless visitors82 are 
men, but there are female visitors too. Some homeless visitors are almost under aged whereas 
others elder-ly.83 The visitors are usually people without a space many people consider home; a 
place of which one has a front door key where you can relax and have privacy. The visitors are in 
general people without jobs or any other legal income, although some sell the local ‘big issue’. 
(Moll, 2005). The majority of them do not receive any dole.84 Many of the visitors have been in jail.
Some of them are ‘on the run’ to avoid being detained (again) to jail or immigration detention. For 
most of the visitors it seems difficult to maintain meaningful relations with family members or with
non-homeless acquaintances and friends, and hence lack a stable social network.85 Welfare safety 
nets have been dismantled in the ongoing process of neoliberalization. In a nutshell; visitors 
usually face multidimensional struggles in their life and their homelessness is usually persistent. 
(Mol, 2005). The causes of the persistency of the homelessness seem to be on the one hand that 
the visitors are so to say inept in life skills.86 Tasks and skills which are normal, easy and self-
82 At Catherine’s house it is common to describe the people visiting the place as visitor, and not as homeless. 
83 During my time at the shelter one homeless visitor was in fact on the run from a retirement home because he did 
not like the treatment he received there.
84 Although some homeless visitors have the right for financial support, but because of problems with welfare 
institutions can not receive it.
85 Anno 2017 many people might consider ‘social network’ to be their social media network but I consider social 
network in the sociological sense.
86 I consider life skills as ‘adaptive and positive behaviour that enable humans to deal effectively with the demands and
challenges of everyday life.’ Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_skills, consulted 05.03.2017.
Although this is not a research into the agency related causes of homelessness, I consider a combination of 
lack of formal education, a lack of positive and caring upbringing, poor languageskills and illiteracy, illegality, a criminal 
record and the combination of mental problems and substance abuse, and moreover the combination of such factors 
are reasons why some people have poor lifeskills. This enumeration is just a fraction of possible frustrations in life, but 
among other things daily issues for the homeless visitors are difficulties with responsibilities such as keeping an 
agenda, to show up on time for appointments and to stick to agreements, to take care of ones finances in a sustainable
fashion and to take care of hygeine and physical health.
34
evident to many in order to experience well-being and self-reliance87 are for most of the visitors a 
problem. The visitors are not well-equipped to be homo economici88, an entrepreneur of their own
life project.
Besides agency related problems there are societal- or structural barriers which are 
problematic89 to the visitors. An example of a particular practical material barrier is the public 
transport chip card which was carried into full effect in 2014. Somebody need to use a chip card9091
as a method of payment to use the Netherlands public transport, which means you need a 
chipcard to acces all trains, buses, trams and subways in the country. For example at train- or 
subway stations one should have the credit card sized chip card scanned at mechanical entrance 
gates in order to have those opened to enter the station.92 In other words: in case one lacks such a 
chip card (or credit balance on the card), a train station, it’s platforms and hence the trains are a 
no-go area. Before the introduction of the public transport chip card visitors could relatively easy, 
with or without a ticket, travel on trains and trams and find shelter (and beg or hustle) in the hubs 
which the train stations are in the bigger cities. Arnold considers barriers such as the public 
transport chipcard there is a disappearance of true public space, and hence of citizenship. (Arnold, 
2004). I refer to the design of spatial arrangements because visitors and other deviating people are
considered as nuisance in public – which is turning progressively into private – space and hence 
they are confronted with increasing measures to avert them from these spaces.93Current 
87 Though quite a few homeless visitors are verbally strong and charming.
88  See paragraph 1.7.
89 In some cases the situation of the homeless people is de facto hopeless, for example for failed asylum seekers who 
are on the run from the police and will sooner or later be caught and extradited out of the European Union or at least 
be locked up in alien detention.
90 Although most people in The Netherlands are using a personalised chipcard, which carries the identity information 
of the owner, in March 2017 it is (still) possible to use a so called anonymous chipcard. However, only in a few big 
trainstrations the cards can be uploaded with cash money. In other words, in case one wants to use the public 
transportcard regularly one needs a bankcard to charge the chipcard. Many homeless people do not have a bankcard  
because they do not have an adress or the right identitypapers to open a bankaccount.
91 The Dutch public transport chipcard is a method of self-control ánd discipline.
92 And hence is a disciplinary practice (Foucault, 1977) as one is registered where one is at what time for how long and 
where one travels to. It is a good example of a contemporary advance of normalizing behavior as nowadays travellers 
function as railway guards taking care to pay for the ride.
93In last decades a transition has occurred in which former public space increasingly became privately owned. A well-
known example is the Canary Wharf business district in London, which is owned and managed by private parties and 
controlled by private security companies. (Luyendijk, 2015). In the context of Utrecht one might consider that the 
central train station is surrounded by an extensive privately owned shopping mall. The interior of this space is not 
considered public and private security companies are working besides the local police. I consider this relevant because 
a private company, who manage for example a shopping mall, serve other purposes than public sector services like the
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developments result in more repressive policies towards homeless people. Homeless people are 
for example exposed to a ‘keep moving policy’ in which the police admonishes – referring to 
public-order crime - the homeless to, obviously, keep moving.94 Homeless people may be fined in 
case they are staying – causing trouble ór resting - in a place. ‘Where social safety nets can be 
spotty, ad hoc, and occasionally Kafkaesque affairs, where people without shelter sometimes have 
no other recourse than (...) prohibited activities, homelessness itself becomes a petty crime.’ 
(Boarder Giles, 2013. P.123). Regulation and prohibition leads to criminalization. (Ticineto Clough, 
P & C. Willse. 2011). There is an increase in prohibition policies. Within such regimes visitors will 
develop financial debts which cannot be redeemed95 and because of that the visitors will be 
sooner or later detained (again). (Beckett, 1997, Beckett & Herbert, 2010, Willse, 2015, Boarder 
Giles, 2016, Margiers, A. 2016 Langegger, S. & S. Koester. 2016, et al.). For example, in The 
Netherlands not paying for public health insurancefees, sleeping outdoors, to gather – two people 
together can be considered a gathering in The Netherlands - urinating and using alcohol or drugs in
public will be fined. (Mol, 2005). However in case one is (an addicted) homeless it is quite hard to 
avoid such situations96 and it is likely a visitor will be considered a ‘habitual offender’.97 The Dutch 
Ministry of Justice for example describes that a ‘new legal arrangement came into effect to expel 
the group of active habitual offender’s long term out of [society]. Habitual offenders are to be 
recognized as such as early as possible. Good registration by the police is therefore necessary. (…) 
police or a municipality. So in case the police or a municipality is willing to have a nuanced approach to socially 
vulnerable people, a private party will obviously not priorize communal ideals but foremostly economic interests.
Beckett mentions that (t)he deployment of the new control tools—touted by proponents as alternatives to 
arrest and punishment—has a “net-widening” effect: it creates crimes and criminal cases that would not otherwise 
exist. Taken together, these techniques represent a dramatic extension of the state’s authority and surveillance 
capacity throughout the urban landscape. The punitive city (…) is one in which an increasing number of acts are 
regulated and criminalized; the state’s ability to search, detain, regulate, and monitor is expanded; and a system of 
invisible yet highly consequential gates and barriers increasingly constrains the movement of some urbanites in public 
space.’ (Beckett & Herbert. 2010, p.11).
94 The author considers the keep-moving policy as incentive to consider homeless people if so desired as criminals 
because of public-disorder. The impression of many of the visitors seems to be that public-order crime criminilizes and 
stigmatizes minority groups and that it is prosecuted selectively.
95 Homeless people lack in general the financial power to pay back debts.
96 It is not otiose to point out this development is quite wicked if one considers homeless people lack a private home 
and therefore can in general not dwell in other spaces than public space. Hence Lefebvre’s coinage ‘right to the city’ 
(Kaulingfreks, F. 2013) appears very relevant in the context of homelessness in Dutch cities.
97 Since 2004 in The Netherlands a cumulation of small, petty crimes like theft, but as well public-order crimes can be 
cause for detention under the label of being a ‘habitual offender’. The term ‘habitual offender’ got common since the 
turn of the millennium. (Ferwerda et al, 2003).
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Habitual offenders will be handled as quickly as possible with effective penalties to stop the 
habitual offending and to prevent them to develop a criminal career. (…) With this measure the 
group can be deprived longer of its freedom. Effectively the committing of new crimes will be 
factually impossible for longer periods.’ (Justitie.nl, 2004).98 Although this factsheet is introduced 
almost 15 years ago I find it a suitable illustration for the ‘decisive’99, (and biopolitical) jargon which
is in vogue in the common political discourse in The Netherlands and other European countries 
since the 2000s. The policy described here is disconcertingly simple and blunt; to detain people 
who commit petty crime in order to achieve a smaller occurrence of criminal acts and to prevent 
the offenders from ‘developing a criminal career’. (Ibid.) It appears increasingly common to be 
considered a habitual offender because of the more repressive regime of monitoring – consider 
here the introduction of the public transport chip card and the keep moving policy - and arresting. 
It appears that the goal of these policies is that the criminal behavior is tackled before it becomes 
‘habitual’, in other words there is less tolerance for deviant behavior. It is relevant to point out that 
most of the visitors are in fact known to the welfare institutions and local authorities, but that their
‘recognition’ and proper ‘registration’ is de facto the problematic issue, for example for numerous 
illegal immigrants whom are by default a bureaucratic impossibility, but as well that many visitors 
are anyways in a perpetual struggle with various welfare institutions and some ‘persistently avoid 
care’. It is not that they are not known for their deviant behavior; there exist a problem of 
organizing the right kinds of care.100 Instead of realising this difficulty, ex- and implicitly 
homelessness is criminalized instead of being considered a wicked problem. Kyle mentions 
policymakers should be aware of the stigmatizing effects of criminalization and begs for a 




99 Which can be considered a development awat from  the nowadays often denounced tolerant approach within the 
more progressive policies of the 1990s. The real impact of the ‘tough’ words will be problematized though, as I will 
show that there are methodological problems in this regard.
100 See for example the description of the movie ‘The Cats of Mirikitani’ at the end of paragraph 1.6.  
101‘’Edwin Schur argues that ‘ (...) the relation between deviance and public policy is reciprocal” (1965, p. 8). The 
definition of behavior as ‘criminal’ is an extreme form of stigmatization. Defining behavior as ‘deviant’ has profound 
effects on those individuals engaging in it  (…). Even when he [sic] is not publicly identified and officially dealt with, he 
is only too aware that his behavior is legally proscribed as well as socially disapproved. Sensing that he is different or is 
doing an unusual act is one thing; feeling that his act is strongly disapproved is another; and knowledge that he has 
become a lawbreaker yet another.’’ (Schur, 1965. P.5,8, in Kyle, 2005. P.23)
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some cities in the U.S., there is no general anti-homelessness legislation applied in The 
Netherlands. But that is not surprising, as such a legislation would beg for a concession from the 
Dutch government as partly responsible to avoid homelessness. To summarize: ‘(H)omelessness is 
frequently treated as a problem of social control. In this case homeless people are labeled as dis-
orderly or disabled and reformed, treated, or contained ac-cordingly. Alternatively, homelessness is
often considered to be a social crisis to which the state is obligated to respond.’ (Margier 2016. 
P.149). We can recognize Willse’s description of homelessness as social crisis. ‘(L)ocal governments 
strive to provide health, human, and housing services to residents who are homeless. Finally, 
homelessness is framed as a problem of property zoning, urban design, and land use regulation. 
Under this rubric, municipal responses to homelessness range from urban design decisions, such as
uncomfortably short park benches, half-walls laden with iron spikes, to public space management 
protocols like park watering regimes timed to roust sleeping people, to a raft of public space 
regulations ranging from anti-loitering bylaws, “sit & lie” ordinances, panhandling codes, park 
curfews, public health codes, and camping bans.’ (Ibid.). 
I think that in a governmental perspective order and security felonies are more productive 
to adjust the behavior of deviant people than a general ban of homelessness. In order to summa-
rize with a self-evidence, a tautology: vulnerable people are most vulnerable102 to those intolerant 
policies.103 That is probably the reason why visitors come to the shelter: To have a coffee or have a 
soup, to take a shower, to get clean clothes, to have a chat or to play a board game. In other words,
to have a breathing space, a little rest for the time being.104 (Hacquebord, 2008). Visitors are expe-
riencing stress perpetually. Visitors often exhibit survival oriented behavior and therefore do not 
have the energy and peace of mind to make long-term commitments to improve their situation. 
102 Ánd by the way vulnerable to aggressive behaviour of other homeless people in their surroundings.
103 Consider for example that habitual offender ‘laws, depending on their scope and discretionary room given to 
judges, can lead to persons being punished quite severely for relatively minor offenses. The discretionary nature of the 
laws means that they can be applied unevenly.’ Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitual_offender, consulted on 
07.04.2017.
See as well the relevant Guardians areticle ‘In a new era of official nastiness, it’s suddenly a crime to be homeless’
 by John Harris on: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/nastiness-crime-homeless 
homelessness-local-authorities-public-spaces-protection-orders, consulted on 22.05.2017.
104 The implicit deal with the local police is that police will only enter the shelter in exceptional situations. The shelter 
is so to say a freehaven from police and social institutions. In case the homeless visitor hides inside the shelter while 
being chased by police, the police has to wait outside the shelter until the suspected visitor comes out of the shelter. 
The other homeless visitors and the volunteers there will make clear that it is no use to wait the whole day inside, as 
the shelter closes at 6pm everyday.
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A less visible but relevant example of a complex agency related problem is that many visi-
tors are having mental health disorders combined with drug- or alcohol addictions.105 (Bhugra, D. 
2007). A homeless person often needs to ‘fulfill’ a therapy in order to successfully attend another 
therapy. For example, a psychologist working with a a homeless person on a mental health pro-
blem might expect a visitor to tackle a drug- or alcohol addiction first in order for the mental 
healthcare treatment to be productive. (Ibid). Whereas the homeless person probably need a drug 
to suppress their mental problems. On the other hand, a rehabilitation therapist will probably 
consider that the mental problems ought to come to a grip before a drug- or alcohol addiction can 
be treated106 This tendency is a rather persistent catch-22 situation107 in which homeless person 
are often moved from pillar to post - much to the dismay of the person.108 ‘The temptation to look 
at only one module of homelessness and singular linear causality leading to homelessness must be 
resisted.’ (Bhugra, 2007. P.xv). Though these issues indicate on the one hand an agency problem of 
the homeless people, the lack or even impossibility of suitable mental healthcare might be 
considered a structural problem.109 ‘The treatment of people with both mental illness and 
substance abuse or dependence (…) perplexes service providers in community psychiatry programs 
105 Bhugra writes that ‘(h)omeless individuals with substance misuse problems are often seen as 'undeserving', and 
consequently have been poorly served by services. Although substance misuse was a prominent finding in Breakey et 
al.'s (1989) study, only one third of men and one tenth of women had recently obtained residential or ambulatory care 
for a substance misuse problem. Mavis et al. (1993) used residential mobility to identify 'homeless out of a total of 938 
subjects. Compared to housed clients, the homeless were more likely to be seeking admission to residential substance 
abuse programmes and a much larger proportion reported previous treatment for alcohol or drug problems.’ (Bhugra, 
D. 2007. P. 103).
106 Consider for example as well Willse’s remark, that ‘case management programmes have frequently mandated 
treatment for psychiatric disabilities and drug/alcohol use, as such conditions and behaviours have especially been 
understood as barriers to what is called ‘housing readiness’. Thus, sobriety and compliance with psychiatric drug 
regimes have frequently been pre-conditions for admittance to housing programmes and minimum requirements for 
remaining housed. Finally, housing programmes have typically included enforced waking and sleep times, limits or 
bans on outside visitors and bans on sexual activity.’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.166). 
107 A catch-22 situation is ‘a situation in which one needs to fulfil two actions which are reciprocally dependent
  on the other action, where one action needs to be fulfilled to accomplish the other mission.’ (Nieuwenhuizen, 2010).
108‘Theresa Funiciello (...) has referred to the social service model of welfare provision as a ‘tyranny of kindness’, 
signalling the coercive nature of paternalistic programmes that demand submission to reform protocols in the name of
the client’s own good. Funiciello’s term perfectly expresses the contradictions of disciplinary power as described by 
Foucault that humanist projects of developing mental and physical capacities proceed through projects of submission 
and control, such that we come to understand that it is only through submission that the subject can be improved and 
liberated.’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.166).
109 I would like to stress a possible dichotomy between agency and structure is not clear-cut and the described 
narratives are oscillating agency and structural issues. I will avoid to let any of the two prevail over the other. However, 
in this research I will put the agency related problems of the homeless visitors as a given. As I describe policies and 
politics I will focus on societal descriptions.
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generally.’110 111(Bhugra, 2007. P. 123).
As a to be social scientist and potentially a social worker I experienced it confronting and 
eye opening that despite the diversity of the people visiting the shelter where I worked – Bhugra 
writes that the ‘homeless population is heterogeneous, disaffiliated from society and lacks trust in 
the statutory services’ (2007, p.100) - many of the visitors hold negative attitudes toward various 
government- and social welfare institutions. (Mol, 2005). The following observation is a major mo-
tivation for the forthcoming research: regardless of many good intentions of volunteers and profes-
sionals and a diverse range of welfare organizations, the service of these organizations altogether 
is apparently not sufficient to assist the visitors in overcoming their complex problems. So on the 
one hand there are various institutions aiming to [re-integrate] the homeless persons, while the 
other, and I will consider even the same, institutions and developments are obstructing people in 
their movements and peace. According to Van Duin it occurs that in case one is in need of various 
(among others medical-, rehabilitation-, financial-, family- and legal-) support, care turns into a re-
gime of a full workweek to address all the different social-, civil-, and health practitioners, which 
makes it rather difficult to keep up with in case one is not well-equipped to do so. (2010). Imagine 
one is having serious physical - hence one is tired often - and mental disorders, for example being 
paranoid: it is a bit of a cheap joke here but that ‘they’ are relentlessly following you is really the 
case. At least in the Dutch [society] the welfare institutions have realized this inconvenient 
situation and aimed to tackle this unproductive situation with the establishment of, something 
typical biopolitical, what I label as ‘secretary-manager-coach social worker’ which assists a client to
keep their agenda in order to manage the meetings with other social workers, civil servants, 
creditors and health practitioners in order to make the therapies more productive. (Van Duin, 
2010). Put bluntly; [re-integrating] is a full workweek which prevents one from developing an 
110 For example: ‘Cognitive impairment is another important factor that is often unrecognized in the homeless mentally
ill. In one study, nearly 40% of homeless men with a mean age of 55 years had severe or mild cognitive impairment and
more than one in four showed severe cognitive impairment (...). Of the group, 15% had alcohol related problems and 
21 % had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The figures for dual diagnosis were not reported.’  (Bhugra, D. 2007. P.103).
111 However, I would like to stress that I do not want to elaborate on the psychological well-being of homeless people 
or to write about the destructive aspects of substance abuse, as I am no psychologist nor health professional. I do not 
even want to elaborate in the very interesting, frus-trating but interesting catch-22 situation between mental health 
care and rehabilitation therapy. I do not want to focus on a particular problematic aspect of mental healthcare, and 
neither for ex-ample on the (dire) results of the financial cuts on this sector and the increase in homelessness as 
immediate result. (Bhugra, 2007). Neither will I propose a best-practice which will, with a positivism which is almost 
magical, solve organizational or [societal] problems.
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informal social network - don’t forget the welfare state as caring state is passé112 and hence such is
paramount nowadays to receive care and support - or free time to search for a job. Or even just 
the peace of mind to try to get energy to deal with life. To summarize: Homeless people are, 
considering the impressions gained during my work at the shelter, often people without the skills 
to have a productive lifestyle - like keeping a job and a dwelling, to manage a household and 
finances in a prudential fashion, to stay in touch with family and friends whom can be a beacon of 
informal care, and find it hard not to be perpetually in contact with police and the justice 
department. These people experience often an entangling combination113 of for example mental 
problems, substance abuse, poor social skills and repressive biopoltical policies. Visitors often have
very negative attitudes towards authorities and their respective professionals. Criminalization and 
structural barriers obstruct homeless people in their peace, privacy and freedom. 
Although the further research and its conclusion will relate and possibly be relevant to the 
above mentioned issues I have another aim with this research. Inspired by my background in social
work I aim to write a philosophically inspired case study regarding [in-] and [exclusion] of the 
physical and the cultural implications of [society]. Namely, what ís the [society] – I will discuss in 
the forthcoming literature analysis of theoretical sociologist Willem Schinkel- am referring to? Does
such even exist, and why is it so persistent in contemporary descriptions? Is that essential for bio-
politics? Why this question is relevant is that namely, to my initial astonishment, quite some visi-
tors seemed acquiescent with their lives – and inter alia confronted me with the relativity of idea 
or concept [society] - though it seems various institutions to [re-integrate] the visitors into [society]
seem not to allow such a relative and pragmatic stance, either theoretically or ethically. Might that 
be a cause for the frictions (Bhugra, 2007) between the experience of visitors and of health profes-
sionals and social workers?
112 See paragraph 1.7. 
113 Because of such factors homeless people ‘have poorer health status; higher rates of physical illness, mental illness, 
and substance abuse; and earlier mortality when compared to the general public.’ (Karaca et al, 2013).
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§1.7 narratives: three stories about ones places in [society]
‘Homeless, what’s that? We are just a moving communal living arrangement.’114
Willem.115
I will narrate in this paragraph two cases which introduce the problem of description of homeless-
ness from personal work experiences. These stories were the motivation for this research. The nar-
ratives serve as the last part of the first chapter introducing the complexity of contextualizing ho-
melessness in [society] and a description of neoliberalism as post-political biopolitics.
As an elderly man Ronald’s116 face is very wrinkly. Although he is a Dutch man - we share our 
mother tongue - we somehow did not communicate much with each other during my shifts at the 
shelter. Maybe we did not have a good understanding, but it might be very likely that Ronald was 
just shy. Or maybe too tired to be social? Maybe he just could not be bothered with the nth 
volunteer or social work trainee at the various shelters he frequented or maybe he just found me 
annoying. On some days he appeared rather confused and not really present with his attention. He
always wore, irregardless of the weather, a winter jacket with a hoody over his head, in a way that 
his eyes were covered by it, alike ‘Kenny’, the infamous character of the South park cartoons. In 
other words, I saw only his nose and mouth when I served him coffee and soup in the shelter. Until
that night we spoke in a cafe I never really got to know him any better: ‘‘It was a sunny day in the 
medieval center of Utrecht and Driss, the coordinator of the shelter with whom I liked to have a 
beer after work shifts, and I were sitting on a terrace at one of Utrecht’s medieval canals. Ronald 
walked by and recognized Driss. Driss swiftly invited him for a drink and discretely  informed the 
bartenders that Ronald was our guest that night; He was drinking on Driss’ bill as crowd in the bar 
initially looked suspicious at this odd looking man. We had quite a few drinks and Ronald mentio-
114 Margier writes that one ‘of the homeless people she interviewed relates how the camp in which he was living was 
the only type of family he had ever known. Following an eviction of the camp, he moved inside. He now has a roof on 
his head but has lost his only social network, and still considers himself homeless. By expressing the fact that some 
homeless people prefer to stay outside, Dooling does not however romanti- cise homelessness. As shelters are often 
experienced as spaces of violence and constraints, many homeless people prefer to stay in public spaces. It is the only 
place where they are able to a find a dwelling space they can share with others and experience a sense of home.’ 
(Margier, A. 2016.P.67).
115 Mol, R & A. Neutel. 2005. P.89.
116 Ronald is not his real name, neither is Driss’.
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ned several times it was such a positive surprise for him to be invited and have a talk and some 
beers. Initially he kept his ‘Kenny’ hoody on, but at some point he took it off - though he kept his 
winter jacket on the whole night, irregardless of the warm weather and the fact that we moved 
into the crowded pub after the night fell. Anyways, for the first time I saw his face: an old, bald 
man. He told us his youth has been rough. He left his parents when he was a young man. He travel-
led the world as a sailor and worked as engineer in various countries. While working in Latin Amer-
ica he witnessed how a police officer tortured a street child to death. He said that up to today he 
relives that experience and that he just cannot understand how somebody could do something 
cruel like that. He was crying when he told it. I felt sorry for him and wanted to change the topic - 
maybe just because I got uncomfortable looking at a wrinkly old man sobbing; I asked him where 
else had he lived - before being homeless?117 He seemed kind of surprised by my question; as it 
was very obvious and therefore stupid to ask. Ronald responded: ‘But I live in Utrecht. I live in Ut-
recht longer than you are around on this planet, and I know any street here: Utrecht is my home. I 
know many people here.’ I have probably uttered something like ‘I meant a place to live, like a 
house’, but realized it was silly, and moreover: that I applied my idea of normality to him. Ronald 
made basically clear that life had been rough to him and that now he was fine the way he lives. 
That he does not need to ‘fit into’ my normative118 assumption, because he already fitted quite 
fine in Utrecht. After that night Ronald went back to generally ignoring me, maybe not even recog-
nizing me any longer, and as I left Utrecht for Lapland, I do not know how he is doing. The last time 
I saw him walking the streets with a small West Highland white terrier. But I learned something 
which I want to apply in this thesis, namely that he felt he belonged, that he was home, on the 
streets of Utrecht. He was not misplaced: my question about where he was living was misplaced 
instead.’’
117 Talking to a homeless person is quite a difficult skill as usually one investigates about meaning and sense of 
direction in life, such as ‘where do you live’, ‘what kind of job do you have’ and ‘what are your ambitions’, ‘are you 
dating somebody or do you have a partner’ or ‘what are your hobbies’. Instead of keeping a conversation going asking 
such questions to a homeless person lead to awkward moments, as such ‘meaningful directions’ are lacking as most 
homeless people are not able to maintain jobs, money to do things, friendships and privacy. In other words, they seem
to lack a future perspective in life.
118 Normativity is a common thing though: as home-less is a negative word (Bauman, 2015), like ex-clusive or un-
employed, it makes, etymologically speaking, immediately clear what is the norm. Kyle mentions as well that 
homelessness implies that ‘homedness’ is the normal state. (Kyle, 2005). ‘In this way, having a home is made to appear
as a static or inherent quality, not a contingent social arrangement.’ (Kyle, 2005. P.25).
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Another person who made a lasting impression to me is Jonathan.119 Jonathan is a Dutch man with
Indonesian roots. He is bright. He likes reading newspapers in the municipal library. He does not 
use any alcohol or drugs. After I met him the first time in the shelter he mentioned ‘it is nice to talk
to somebody who is thinking a bit, as I am surrounded in daily life by drunkards, drug dealers and 
criminals.’ We often played a game of chess at the shelter. When he had a bad night with little 
sleep – he boycotts the various designated night shelters and hence sleeps in places outdoors 
found by himself – I had a chance to win, but in case he slept well he usually won. When I met him 
in the morning at the central train station of Utrecht we often had a breakfast together, to the 
point where Jonathan was just waiting outside the bakery where we often ‘accidentally’ met.
Indonesia is a former colony of the Netherlands, and like Jonathan, there are many people 
with Indonesian roots living in the Netherlands. Jonathan studied cultural anthropology when he 
was a young man, where he learned about the atrocities of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia and 
elsewhere in the world. He got depressed and decided that ‘he wanted to have nothing to do with 
the Dutch government or [society].´ I think Jonathan is suffering from paranoid personality disor-
der, but my pseudo-psychological intuition is not relevant for this study. What I found very interes-
ting but likewise saddening, as he does not even look or act like a ‘bum´, is that because of his 
need to be as autarkic as possible he is in a permanent struggle with the Dutch government and its
various welfare institutions. Jonathan seems to request a status-quo; ‘let me have my basic rights, 
and leave me alone for the rest, as I do not want or expect anything else from Dutch [society].’ 
Mostly Jonathan wants a minimal dole by the Dutch government to rent a house, to which he is 
entitled to as a Dutch citizen, but currently lacks any (id-)papers and an official place of residence. 
Hence, as he lacks a social security number and postal address, he cannot work legally, he cannot 
have a phone contract, and he cannot receive hardcopy mail nor open a bank account. As such he 
cannot travel on public transport. At the outset Jonathan is not doing anything illegal but because 
of the criminalization of homelessness and his seclusive and erratic behavior he is in a perpetual 
struggle with the Dutch authorities. So though Jonathan does not steal or use drugs or alcohol and 
does not cause any nuisance in public space he is ‘left without care’, not even the little care he 
wants and needs. I think he became so to say an habitual offender because of his strong need to be
left alone. This is a frustrating paradoxical spiral for both Jonathan and all professionals surroun-
119 Jonathan is not his real name.
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ding him. For example, when Jonathan considers that somebody like a social worker or -trainee 
invades his privacy and does not respect his views on life, and that person is insisting their ‘service’
or’care’ on him he will eventually beat the social worker or civil servant as he knows that will end 
him ‘blacklisted’ for a while. That means that he won’t be bothered for the time being by some 
authorities, until after a certain amount of time he appears again on the radar of a social worker, 
police agent or mental health practitioner. Jonathan seems to be stuck as he somehow cannot 
break through the cycle of criminalization and to for him counterproductive social work as no care 
seems to be customized for him, or respects his worldview for that matter. The social welfare insti-
tutions seem persistent to [integrate] Jonathan into a more productive life though. It’s like a taboo 
to admit there is no sufficient care and neither need for some ‘unadjusted’ people. As if some per-
sistent fallacies of our [societies] are not allowed to be spoken about openly.
The documentary ‘Cats of Mirikitani´ of 2006 offers an interesting biopolitical context similar to 
Ronald and Jonathan’s situation, but the relevant aspect of this documentary is that it shows the 
bureaucratic struggle of a homeless particularly clear. 
Linda Hattendorf started filming Jimmy Mirikitani in the summer of 2001. Mirikitani is then 
over 80 years old. He lives on the streets of Manhattan. He is born in Sacramento, California in a fa-
mily of immigrants of Japanese descent. Mirikitani is raised in Hiroshima. When Mirikitani turns 18 
years old, his family takes care he lives in the United States again – Mirikitani has the U.S. citizen-
ship – to evade the conscription of militaristic pre-WW2 Japan. Artistic and gentle Mirikitani plans 
to study art in the United States instead. After the Pearl Harbor attacks Mirikitani’s US citizenship, 
among 120.000 other Japanese Americans120, was renounced and he was interned for 3.5 years in 
a U.S. concentration camp during World War two. In a letter to request his release from the intern-
ment camp Mirikitani writes that ‘I am studying to become an artist, to combine traditions of East 
of West in the free world. With such high ambition I came back to my native country.’ Unfortunate-
ly Mirikitani’s U.S. citizenship was only restored in 1959, but Mirikitani never received that infor-
mation: the letter to him was undeliverable because he changed often adresses over the years.121 
120 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internment_of_Japanese_Americans#cite_note-howmany-5, consulted on 
01.06.2017.
121 ‘Executive Order 9066 forced Jimmy and his sister to leave their home and move to separate internment camps 
hundreds of miles apart. (…) When the government required internees to take a loyalty test, Tule Lake became a 
segregation center where those deemed "disloyal" were congregated. Thousands there renounced their US citizenship 
in protest. Jimmy was one of these renunciants. After the war ended, Jimmy and hundreds of others continued to be 
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Mirikitani became homeless in 1980 and earned money making paintings about the internment 
camps, and cats. The documentary shows he ‘won’t take money (as beggar), except for his 
art (-sales).’ Mirikitani as elderly man expresses his anger about the internment camps; ‘How do 
you explain put American citizens into camps, and die? 18.000 people in my camp died!’122
When 9/11 occurred Linda Hattendorf met Mirikitani on his usual spot near a Korean corner store 
on the then deserted dust-clouded streets after the collapse of the twin towers. Hattendorf invites 
Mirikitani to stay at her small apartment. She films a clip from a U.S. newsprogramme that narrates
that ‘a measure of racial profiling is necessary in response to 9/11’ to which Mirikitani mumbles ‘it 
is just like what happened after Pearl Harbor.’ Mirikitani slumbers at Hattendorf for months while 
she organizes that Mirikitani can live in a retirement home for elderly people. The most striking 
and relevant scene of the movie in a biopolitical perspective, besides the postponement of rights 
during WW2 and after 9/11, is that Hattendorf tries to get Mirikitani signed up for elderly care. 
Jimmy Mirikitani does not seem to be interested in that though; the conversation at the ‘check in’ 
for elderly care goes as follows (2006):
Hattendorf: ‘He has become homeless since he was a young adult. He is not involved in any 
community agency.’
Mirikitani: ‘I got no need for a social security number, I’m quite strong.’
Social worker trying to register Mirikitani talks to Hattendorf: ‘Hardly any retirement homes take 
elderly homeless people.’ Turns to Mirikitani: ‘In order for a social security number, you need an id 
card, an identity card with your age on it.’
Mirikitani: ‘Never went to social security. I don’t need social security.’
held without charge, first in Tule Lake, then in a Department of Justice INS camp in Crystal City, Texas. A single lawyer, 
Wayne Collins, worked for decades to help Jimmy and 5,000 other renunciants reclaim the citizenship they had given 
up under duress. In 1946, Jimmy was transferred to Seabrook Farms, a frozen food manufacturing plant near Bridgeton
New Jersey. Here he and other renunciants on "relaxed internment" worked the 12 hour night shift, 6 days a week, 
sorting vegetables on an assembly line. By August 1947, Collins won their release, but fully restoring their citizenship 
took another decade. Jimmy's US citizenship was finally restored in 1959, but by then he had moved so often that the 
government's letter never reached him. Eventually Jimmy became a live-in cook on Park Avenue. But when his 
employer died in the late 1980's, Jimmy was suddenly without a home or a job. (…) Within a year, he was living in 
Washington Square Park in Greenwich Village, selling his artwork to survive. He met filmmaker Linda Hattendorf in 
Soho in 2001. She helped him apply for Social Security, SSI, and housing benefits, and in 2002 he moved into an 
assisted-living retirement center run by Village Care of New York. Later that year, he was reunited with his sister Kazuko
for the first time in 60 years. Both Jimmy and his sister passed away in 2012, ten years after they were reunited.’
Source: http://www.thecatsofmirikitani.com/aboutFilm.htm, consulted on 12.05.2017.
122 Elderly Mirikatini speaks so to say ‘broken’ English.
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Social worker (looks to Hattendorf): ‘He really does not want it. (Looks to Mirikitani) We want to 
find out your benefits, like social security and things like that, so we could help you. Do you want to
help us to find a place to live?’
Mirikitani: ‘no thank, no thank you.’
Social worker: ‘Why not?’
Mirikitani: ‘No need, no need, no need for passport.’ (Mirikitani refuses to sit down in the office 
while they social workers hint him to do so).
Social worker: ‘Do you have a social security number, or card?’
Mirikitani: ‘I got a social security number.’ (Mirikitani seems inconsistent here, but the social 
worker clears up and looks happy suddenly). ‘No need to help, no need to help.’ Mirikitani starts 
talking about art.
Social worker: ‘A social security would give you some money that you could have’.
Mirikitani: ‘They took everything; my passport. You are an American citizen: They cannot take. They
took it! They took everything! U.S. government cut their citizenships: go to Japan!’123 I don’t need 
American U.S. passport; it’s garbage this country. After the war, we had to go to an internment 
camp.124
Especially Mirikitani’s story, considering the revoking of his passport, and to some extent 
Jonathan’s story too, illustrate a state racism described by Foucault: how easily people can turn 
into bare life; into bodies without rights, where a sovereign power -  in this case a biopolitical-
sovereign-whom-does-not-want-sovereignty-but-political-and-social-order - annuls citizen rights. 
(Agamben, 2005). Both Jonathan and Mirikitani were initially citizens but because of some 
problematic developments they lost that right. I have highlighted the failed ‘check in’ of Mirikitani 
at the elderly home to illustrate the difficulty to deal in a bureaucracy with people without the 
right identity papers: as sans papiers do not fit into a bureaucracy they are devoid of 
institutionalized care. But bare life is obviously denied rights. However, from a governmental 
123 Japanese American ‘(r)enuncations were denied counsel, the right to be represented or adviced an attorney or have
any legal advice whatsoever. 7 out of 10 Japanese citizens born in US gave up their US citizenship.’ Source: 
http://www.thecatsofmirikitani.com/aboutFilm.htm, consulted on 12.05.2017.
124 Hattendorf get after this unfruitful conversation by coincidence in contact with Mirikitani’s sister, who happened to 
be still alive and lives on the U.S. Westcoast. His sister lost contact with Mirikitani after they were put in different 
concentration camps. Through his sister Hattendorf learns more about Mirikitani and with that information she is able 
to succesfully apply for Mirikitani’s social security eventually. (2005).
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perspective, let us put it as a Foucaultian perspective, this is not the sole, and not the most 
sophisticated, biopolitical problem.
Even if there might be diversions (as bureaucracy is never as tight as it ‘ideally’ should be) 
(Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks, 2001) Jonathan’ and Mirikitani’s stories express how hard it is for people 
living in precarious and disadvantaged circumstances and capabilities to have the serenity, willing-
ness and discipline to find their way to get recognition and the status they deserve. I write delibe-
rately ‘recognition’ here and not per se care, because that is not per se the highest priority of the 
described men: What I found most striking is that, like Ronald, Mirikitani, feels he has a meaningful
life on the street, selling his art and having a social life, whereas not ‘fitting in’ officially by a 
governmental- and welfare system. This is alike Ronald and Jonathan; though they admit they have
certain problems in life, their position in the world seems to make more sense to them than to the 
whole arrangement of professionals surrounding them. So, on the one hand, structural violence 
such as revoking identitypapers and criminalization, and the general impossibility to deal with 
illegal people in western nation states, are very relevant problems regarding homelessness, but on 
the other hand the impossibility to organize good care is a related relevant problem. Shall we 
consider the imaginative poverty to describe homelessness by institutions, politics and media as a 
stigmatizing effect for example?125 Bhugra mentions that the ‘provision of comprehensive services 
for the mentally ill homeless is time-consuming and complex. However, it is also an opportunity to 
be innovative and flexible and may, in time, serve to inform the development of the standard 
mental health services.’ (2007. P.107). In the following chapter, which will function as the 
theoretical core of this study, we will do an attempt to be innovative and flexible with the 
application of critical philosophy.
125 Consider for example Willse’s remark that ‘(p)eople living without shelter have especially been understood as 
incapable of self-management. Media and government accounts depict ‘the homeless’ as possessing failed selves 
that require invasive social assistance. Many decades of formal and informal policy have made treatment for 
substance abuse and psychiatric disabilities a mandatory condition for entering and remaining in housing 
programmes. Such earlier policy argued that drug / alcohol and psychiatric treatment, as well as social service 
programmes focused on money management, job training and a wide range of other so-called life skills, make 
formerly ‘shelter-resistant’ individuals ‘housing- ready’. (Willse, C. 2010. P.156). 
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Chapter 2: [society] for itself
§2.1 [society] as myth
‘Is it possible to define a totality, or must we be content with reconstituting connections?’
Michel Foucault.126
‘What fits into nothing is real.’
Jules Deelder.127
‘We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure.’
Gilles Deleuze.128
‘We may wish to draw a dividing-line; but any limit we set may perhaps be no more than an arbi-
trary division made in a constantly mobile whole. We may wish to mark off a period; but have we 
the right to establish symmetrical breaks at two points in time in order to give an appearance of 
continuity and unity to the system we place between them? Where, in that case, would the cause 
of its existence lie? Or that of its subsequent disappearance and fall? What rule could it be obeying 
by both its existence and its disappearance? If it contains a principle of coherence within itself, 
whence could come the foreign element capable of rebutting it? How can a thought melt away be-
fore anything other than itself? Generally speaking, what does it mean, no longer being able to 
think a certain thought? Or to introduce a new thought?’
Michel Foucault.129
The forthcoming theoretical consideration will deepen the practical rooted descriptions and criti-
que of last paragraphs. As mentioned in the former chapter we will not research how to improve 
126 Foucault, M. 1969. P4.
127 Adjustment of a one sentence poem by the Dutch beatpoet Jules Deelder. (2012). The poem literally translates as: 
‘What appears like nothing is real’ (In Dutch language: ‘wat nergens op lijkt, is echt’).
128 Deleuze, G. 1992. P.3.
129 Foucault, M. 2005. P. 56.
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social work directly: We will question the literal self-evidence130 of [society].131 A direction for 
thought about the problematized framing of biopolitical (inclusion) will be sketched through a 
critique of the application of [society]. Is [society] as discourse needed in order to apply an 
allegedly ‘neutral’132 analytical grid necessary for governmentality? What is the space and the 
boundary of biopower? Our sober task is to investigate how a discourse functions in which one, or 
in fact many, have to adjust into, and with that demand ‘forgot’ or deny they were already there.133
I consider Foucaults notion of dispersed events134 as similar to my description of a rhizomatic 
horizontal135 multiplicity as alternative notion for [society].136 
[Society] imagined as closed and comprehensive system developed along the rise of mo-
dern nation states.137 (Schinkel, 2007). According to Schinkel the dominant metaphor for [societies]
130 What are being analysed here are certainly not the terminal states of discourse; they are the preterminal 
regularities in relation to which the ultimate state, far from constituting the birth-place of a system, is defined by its 
variants.’ (Foucault, 1973. P.84). 
Self-evidence in this context should be taken as literal as can: as something which is referring to itself.
131 Not without the hope that such an endeavour might improve social work! I would like to stress that I am not a 
priori against social work or welfare assistance and neither about a critical assesment of its quality, but in the stories of
Jonathan, Mirikitani and Ronald it became clear there is a biopolitical problem which is not defined by the homeless 
men themselves, but by the burocracy of welfare institutions and the legal system, in other words by governance.
132 Social work, like all interference with humans, is a political matter but it is described as if it is neutral, for example 
as ‘problem management’, and it is based on ‘scientific’ rooted technocracy. (Schinkel, 2014).
133 For example Schuilenburg writes that the ‘ set 'outside-inside' (inclusion and exclusion) cannot be reduced to a 
binary dichotomy. Both forms make people part of a homogeneous and unifying whole that explains nothing in itself, 
but rather is constantly being redefined. Agamben calls this the 'inclusive exclusion' of bare life with the social form of 
life (bios).’ (Schuilenburg, 2008. p.2). 
134The application of fiction [society] makes ‘‘it possible to group a succession of dispersed events (…) and link them to 
one and the same organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life (with its adaptations, its 
capacity for innovation, the incessant correlation of its cover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of 
coherence and the outline of a future unity, to master time through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin 
and a term that are never given but are always at work. (…) We must question those ready-made syntheses, those 
groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; 
we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; 
they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign. And instead of according them unqualified, 
spontaneous value, we must accept, in the name of methodological rigour, that, in the first instance, they concern only 
a population of dispersed events.’’ (Foucault, 1972. P.24).
135 For example Platonic idealism has been an important fallacy in Western (philosophical) thought. Its rudiments are 
rather persistent in many facets of life. It would be more nuanced and interesting, and more benign, to stop implying a 
foundation exists.
136 ‘Behind the completed system, what is discovered by the analysis of formations is not the bubbling source of life 
itself, life in an as yet uncaptured state; it is an immense density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations.’   
(Foucault, 1973. P.85).
137 [Societies] are often considered as bounded to a certain territory. That is because of the state/society 
differentiation which has developed in modernity, in which the society houses its citizens, whom are members of the 
nationstate. The society overlays the territorial nation. The common-sense notion is still a national society. (Schinkel, 
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is that they are ‘organisms’. Schinkel explained [society] as a rudiment of an organicist theology 
which consists in an implied appreciation of the unity and stability of the whole body, which results
in a perpetual scrutiny of its smallest parts. (2007). Fiction [society] is a secularized transcendental,
but [it] cannot ‘think’ of [it’s] genesis: [society] ignores [it’s] beginning and pretends [it] has always 
been there.138 The self-referentiality of [societal] self-observation is problematic because [society] 
lacks the necessary transcendental means, in other words an outside perspective, to observe itself.
There is a counterfactual situation at work, namely that for [society] to be self-evident it needs a 
[transcendental] foundation. A foundation hides the immanence of [it’s] auto-coincidation. 
Schinkel claims that Western philosophical thinking has been a theology: an attempt to make a 
firm and original foundation. (Schinkel, 2007. P.192). If humanity would get to terms with 
immanence people ought to conclude there lacks a foundation of [society].139 A critical perspective
will make clear [societies] are immanent and open (as in: without solid borders). If there ought to 
be a ‘foundation’ in sociology it ought to be it’s instability140, and to study such is genuine 
sociology according to Schinkel. (2007). Social spaces are constantly moving and unrecognizable 
without ‘between brackets’. (Schinkel, 2007. P.295). Especially in a globalized world a notion of 
bracketed spaces are fallacious because of fluidization or in other words immanentization: 
nowadays it is increasingly harder to apply (territorial) borders. Foucault mentions that ‘such a 
unity (like [society]) is the result of an operation. (…) Thus one is led inevitable, though the naivety 
of chronologies, towards an ever receding point that is never itself present in any history; this point
is merely its own void; and from that point all beginnings can never be more than recommence-
ments or occultation (in on and the same gesture, this and that).141 (Foucault, 1972. P.28). To 
2007. P.262). Because of globalization a regionalized notion is not useful because it implies a border to a social 
differentiated system. (Schinkel, 2007).
138 Hence contemporary obsessions with the ‘identity’ of (society), an impossibility if one considers (society) as 
immanent networks.
139 Critical philosophy has debunded myths about transcendentals: For example: ‘What then is truth? A movable host 
of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a  sum of human relations which have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding. Truths are illu sions which we have forgotten are illusions—they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force (…).’ (Nietzsche, 1873. P.4).
140 Foucault questions ‘where’ is the shared place things lay next to each other in the ‘Order of things’: It is not 
possible to determine a common place as basis for things. (1969).
141 ‘(T)his operation is interpretative (…). (It) can be regarded neither as an immediate unity, nor as a certain unity, nor 
as a homogeneous unity. (…) To this theme is connected another according to which all manifest discourse is secretly 
based on an ‘already-said’; and that his already-said is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text 
that has already been written, but a ‘never-said’, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath. A writing that 
51
[[integrate] into [society]] is an empty signifier, a symbol without reference: it is a void. ‘’(W)e are 
dealing with an ‘autopoietic machine’ (…) that reverts to immanent justifications and rationales 
that it creates itself’’ (Lemke, 2011. P. 70), but that machine denies the autopoiesis. [Society] can 
only refer to [itself] by the abnormal as negative referent of its perfect (and hence transcendental, 
perfect as in godlike) domain: but defined in its negative. (Schinkel, 2007). As such [society] cannot 
and will not be described in a positive manner: hence the dramatic and nagging hypochondriac 
obsession with all kinds of ‘strange’ elements which ‘treat’ [society] such as immigrants, ‘Islam’ or 
‘terror’, and as well the niggling and unfortunate search for national identities.142 Social worlds are 
too complex to have a holistic perspective on the (whole), which could be endorsed by all.143 
The problematic in current descriptions of [society] imagined as ‘organism’ is that the 
whole is accredited an autonomy which transcends the individual parts. (Schinkel, 2007). The con-
temporary common description of [society] and its stress on individual [integration] contains a pa-
radox: the to be [integrated] people are de facto deindividualized and individualized by being ‘put’ 
in ‘focus groups’ such as homeless people, drug users, criminals, immigrants, people with a non-
western religion, people-who-do-not-use-computers, etc.144 (Ibid.). Talking about [integration] as-
sumes a rupture, but the performative act – talking about [society] - makes the rupture. (Ibid.). 
Deleuze and Foucault have pointed out that individualization is necessary for governmentality: The
problem of the ‘whole’ is ‘grasped’ by ‘making’ sociological and individual parts. (1992). ‘Every 
form of knowledge makes order by investigations of differences, and those differences are made by
is merely the hollow of its own mark. It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was 
already articulated in that semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it 
covers and silences. The manifest discourse therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does 
not say, and this ’not-said’ is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said.’ (Foucault, 1972. P.28).
142 Think in case for example about ‘citizenship tests’, which immigrants have to pass in order to be(come) a citizen. 
143 The social is a functional differentiated patchwork of systems. Every social system, such as economy, love, the 
natural environment, the police, etcetera have their own frames - in Deleuzian terms: planes - of ‘seeing’ things. 
(Schinkel, 2007). 
144 And hence the people ´out of place´ have been organized: ‘’The concept of ‘organization’ is, we argue, rooted in the
possibility and necessity to keep chaos, contingency, disorder, defilement, and irrational principles at bay. (…) Rather 
than accepting reality as it is, the very idea of organization seems to imply that it is possible for us to stay in a kind of 
otherwordly, Platonic space where clarity, transparency, and health reign supreme.’‘ (Kaulingfreks & Ten Bos. 2005, 
P.88).
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the implication of a certain order.’145 (Foucault, 1969. P.374). Productive fiction146 [society as a 
perfect domain] individualizes and normalizes. In case of alleged deviancy147  the (in-)dividual 
bears the responsibility to change – not [perfect domain society]. (Pearson, 1975). Colebrook 
writes that ‘‘‘outside’ is not spatially separated from the world we inhabit; rather, the "outside" is 
nothing more than the relations of forces through which we live, see, and say (...). There is space, 
the experience of space, only because of a non-spatial ‘outside’ that is nothing more than a play of 
forces.’’ (Colebrook, 2004. P.2). Myth [society] is a discursive exclusion mechanism which opens the
possibility for another mythical space, namely [outside society]. Schinkel points out that sociologi-
cal research and all well-meant social policy usually implies the [society as body] discourse, which 
reproduces the discursive exclusion (stigmatization) of the people it aims and claims to ‘include’.148 
(Schinkel, 2007).
§ 2.2 [society] as a means for an analytical grid for governmentality
‘- Do you feel rehabilitated?
- Rehabilitated? Now let me see. You know I don’t have any idea what that means?
- Well, it means that you’re ready to rejoin society…
- I know what you think it means, sonny. To me it’s just a made-up word, a politician’s word. So 
young fellas like yourself can wear a suit, and tie, and have a job’.149
Chomsky’s conversation with Foucault in 1971 is relevant in relation to the problem of the imma-
nent multiplicity often framed as [society] and governmentality based on a transcendental. 
Chomsky writes in retrospection to his encounter with Foucault that the French philosopher 
145 ‘(R)egulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of 
homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field. In a word, security 
mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize
a state of life.’ (Foucault, M. 2003. P.46). 
146 (Society) is a fiction, but it works: A system functions as it ‘believes’ in itself. (Schinkel, 2007. P.230). Foucault 
mentioned that ‘(d)iscourse and system produce each other – and conjointly only at the crest of this immense reverse. 
(Foucault, 1973. P.85).
147 Which is not solely focused on biological features individuals but increasingly on cultural aspects too by the way 
such as ‘religion’ or ‘culture’, for example if one has a ‘non-western culture’ [integration] is another matter than for a 
western immigrant. (Schinkel, 2007).
148 See as well footnote 127. 
149 Excerpt from ‘The Shawshank Redemption.’  In: Schinkel, 2007. P.130.
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‘considers the scientific knowledge of a given epoch to be like a grid of social and intellectual condi-
tions, like a system of rules of which permit the creation of new knowledge. In his view (…) human 
knowledge is transformed due to social conditions and social struggles, with one grid replacing the 
other, thus bringing new possibilities to science. He is, I believe, skeptical about the possibility or 
the legitimacy of an attempt to place important sources of human knowledge within the human 
mind, conceived in an ahistorical manner.’150 (Chomsky, 1977. P. 75). I think Chomsky would con-
sider [society] as necessary idealization and conceptualization151, and that Foucault would have 
indeed criticized152 such a stance, as he has showed how throughout history perspectives on scien-
ces and humans have shifted indeed. (2005). Schinkel has explained that humanity needs a trans-
cendental in order to justify norms (and moreover normalizing sanctions), and humanity need the 
fiction [society] to do so. Considering the incentive and rationalization for social interventions; an 
analytical grid serves as justification and ‘calibration’ for governmentality, such as social work but 
as well for something like (alien) detention. I assume it is necessary to apply a notion of [society], 
as a transcendent, to support and legitimize analytical grids without which one cannot point out, in
150 See for example Chomsky’s remark that ‘(l)earning is primarily a matter of filling in detail within a structure that is 
innate. We depart from the tradition in several respects, specifically, in taking the ‘a priori system’ to be biologically 
determined.’ (Chomsky, 1977. P. 39). ‘(W)e can know so much because in a sense we already knew it, though the data 
of sense were necessary to evoke and elicit this knowledge. Or to put it less paradoxically, our systems of belief are 
those that the mind, as a biological structure, is designed to construct. We interpret experience as we do because of 
our special mental design. We attain knowledge when the ‘’inward ideas of the mind itself’’ and the structures it 
creates conform to the nature of things.’ (Chomsky, 1977. P. 8.).
151Chomsky is referring to an ahistorical and innate human nature, in other words an (human) essence which can be 
found through normal science. Chomsky mentions idealization as necessary for ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ science: 
‘opposition to idealization is simply objection to rationality; it amounts to nothing more than an insistence that we 
shall not have meaningful intellectual work. Phenomena that are complicated enough to be worth studying generally 
involve the interaction of several systems. Therefore you must abstract some object of study, you must eliminate those 
factors which are not pertinent. At least if you want to conduct an investigation which is not trivial. In the natural 
sciences this ist’t even discussed, it is self-evident. In the human sciences, people continue to ques-tion it. That is 
unfortunate. When you work within some idealization, perhaps you overlook something which is terribly important. 
That is a contingency of rational inquiry that has always been understood. One must not be too worried about it. One 
has to face this problem and try to deal with it, to accommodate oneself to it. It is inevitable.’ (Chomsky, 1977. P. 57). 
That the objectivity of social sciences is to be disputed is because humans are intrinsically part of the 
research, so the common subject-object relation, for example a team of geologisst digging in the ground and find 
‘iobjective’ matter, such a relation is to be problematized if the researched things are the same as the researchers.
152 See for example: ‘‘it does not lie in the visible, horizontal coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well anterior 
to their formation, in the system that makes possible and governs that formation. But in what way can we speak of 
unities and systems? How can we affirm that we have properly individualized certain discursive groups or wholes? 
When in a highly random way we have uncovered, behind the apparently irreducible irreducible multiplicity of objects, 
statements, concepts, and choices, a mass of elements that were no less numerous or dispersed, but which were 
heterogenenous with one another?’  (Foucault, 1972. P. 80).
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a scientific manner, one is deviating.153 ‘Analytical grids are part of discursive formations which are 
governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness 
and a priori individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the 
boundaries of thought in a given domain and period.’ (Nauta, L. 1971). ‘‘(O)ur thinking and institu-
tions had always relied on some ‘exteriority’: something that we feel we can know, reveal or inter-
pret and which will give us a foundation. Foucault argued that this resulted in an ‘ethics of know-
ledge’ whereby we imagine that if we get the facts about some outside world right then we will 
know what to do.’’ (Colebrook, C. 2002. P.71). ‘‘Grids are (...) codification, to visibility and to ma-
king this knowledge intelligible. In the order of things (1970) Foucault announced that ‘an episteme
is, very roughly, a conceptual grid that provides conception of order, sign and language that allow 
a sense of discursive practices to qualify as ‘knowledge’. (…) In the control of space154 the grid also 
become a significant tool of power.’’ (Dale, K. & B. Burrel. 2008. P.62). The analytical grids are not 
neutral but political. Moral problems - deviance is a moral problem – are studied with analytical 
grids and reduced, ‘grasped’ so to say to technical problems, instead of moral problems, which 
need professional care. (Pearson, 1975). 
§2.3 myth [society] as autopoietic and allopoietic
By elaborating on Schinkels insights I have tried to point out that contemporary [inclusion] leans on
the idee fixe [society]. Hence, by the demand to be included a performative occurs in the 
meantime as double bind. (Schinkel, 2007). Following that I have considered that myth [society] is 
needed to apply governmental interventions. I have investigated that analytical grids (based) on 
[society] are an essential part of governmentality. But what is the consequence of these grids? In 
this paragraph I will investigate that [society] produces itself without ever achieving its ideal (be-
153 To be a deviant in itself implies that one deviates from a certain norm, and that implies there exists such a medium:
To assume deviation it means there exist a (society). Deviance is grasped and labeled as ‘disease’. There is a 
contradiction at work here: compassion is suited for the ones whom are considered unaccountable for their deviance: 
if somebody is deviant somebody has to be ill; there is a strong focus on medical sciences in the contemporary 
analytical grids. (Pearson, 1975).
154 See as well: ‘‘capitalism is under the compulsion to eliminate all spatial barriers, to ‘annihilate space through time’ 
as Marx puts it, but it can do so only through the production of a fixed space. Capitalism thereby produces a 
geographical landscape (of space relations, of territorial organisation, and of systems of places linkded in a ‘global’ 
division of labour and of functions) appropriate to its own dynamic of accumulation at a later date’ (…). This process is 
what Harvey describes as capitalism’s ‘spatial fix’: capitalism cannot do without its ‘spatial fixes’. (Dale, K. & B. Burrel. 
2008. P.17).
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cause that ideal is transcendental). But is the reproduction perfect? I consider [society] as 
autopoiesis, a creation out of itself, which discursively needs nevertheless an external and 
transcendent foundation, which it essentially lacks: [It] refers to [itself] as [foundation], though in 
absentia. In this paragraph I will research [society] as machine155 that is ‘producing an illusion 
exceeding all strata, even though the machine itself still belongs to a determinate stratum.’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.71). 
Franz Kafka’s story about ‘The great wall of China’ explains how a region is confirmed as a 
unity, a fixed and a transcendent exactly because of such absence. What I consider particularly 
interesting in Kafka’s story to this study is his reference to the impossibility to wall China; That the 
project can not achieve its own purpose, but the venture is productive because of that. The 
allegory, which I will paraphrase, tells about bricklayers and engineers from all over China whom 
are put to the sheer insurmountable task to wall the enormous area. In order to do so decades 
before the actual building begins schoolchildren are already prepared for China’s historical task. 
The reason to build the wall is to keep alleged nomadic, wandering and barbaric peoples ‘from the 
north’ outside of China. However, the protagonist, whom is from the south of China - whom lives 
near the Himalayan mountains of Tibet - stresses such exotic people have never been seen in his 
province, and that China is so immense that the nomadic people could not really harm China nor 
wander far into the China. They would just get lost in the width of the steppes. In a nutshell, the 
protagonist relativizes the problem with the nomadic barbarians. 
Due to the immensity of the project and to avoid the workers to burnout, to spare them 
from existential dread so to say, considering it will be impossible to finish such a task in a foresee-
able future - two teams of bricklayers are working towards each other, each spending five years on 
500 meters in order to have a completed piece of wall of one kilometer after five years. After fini-
shing a piece of wall there will be a celebration held for the finishing of that kilometer. The workers
will be awarded and send to their home regions, travelling to their respective provinces far away 
155 Which is described by Maturana & Varela as ‘a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its 
realization as such a network. (...) the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described
by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, 
however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection.’ 
(Maturana & Varela. 1980. p.78 & 89)
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from China’s north border region. During their travels they will meet new workers whom will work 
on their respective 500 meters. The returnees witness trees will have been cut in order for the 
scavots to build the wall, and they will meet townsfolk in the countryside cheering about their 
efforts. All over China people would learn about the building of its great defense wall, in order to 
keep the barbaric tribespeople out: This endeavor will unite the people.
However, due to the method of building intermittently, essentially every time a piece of 
wall is finished, on numerically more places there are openings where the nomadic people could 
‘enter’ China. The storyteller mentions as well that the nomadic people – ‘the barbarians’ - who 
move much faster and more freely than the workers on the wall, have a much better understan-
ding of the development of the wall, and as well that they could easily destroy deserted finished 
pieces of wall. Therefore, the workers find that building in parts is ineffective: ‘How can it be that 
the highest powers would proceed with something as illogical?’ ‘So many lives are lost on the de-
velopment of the wall? Many men spend the best years of their life working on a task which will 
probably be never finished?’ Most workers realize they cannot really comprehend with common 
sense in the immensity of the project, but they have to assume their leader, their emperor know 
why to build in this way. Kafka writes ‘in the office of the leaders – where it was and who was 
there, nobody whom I asked knew – in that office should be all human thoughts and results. 
The offices of the highest officials are remote, in the capital Beijing, where none of the wor-
kers have ever been. It is de facto out of reach to the people in the regions. However, the more far 
off one gets from the office of the emperor, the more people have to believe that the orders are 
sensible because they lack any real information why decisions are taken. Irregardless of their faith, 
there is as well a sceptic stance towards the central authority: As China is such a wide country, the 
ordinary folk in the countryside assume that if news from the emperor reaches them, that very 
emperor probably had already died by then. At that time there is probably already a new emperor 
installed, from which they will hear only years later. It would be an accurate description to realize 
that the townspeople have de facto no emperor according to themselves. The alleged center of the
to be walled area is to the people like a void: they wonder if the far away capital really exists. ‘We 
are loyal, but to something alien and essentially strange. This weakness is of most importance to 
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us, it is binding us townspeople. This absence and weakness is the ground on which we live.’156 
(Kafka, 1963. Paraphrased and italics by author). 
In the beginning of this research Diana Nieuwold, representative of the Dutch Salvation 
Army, was quoted in regard of the increase of homelessness in The Netherlands: ‘"The municipali-
ties, housing corporations and welfare agencies must work well together. As soon as a housing cor-
poration signals that the rent is not paid or there are complaints about the resident there should 
be immediate intervention. There should be good arrangements between the involved parties. 
What we (FN: The Netherlands Salvation Army) would like to see is that people can live in social 
housing apartments. And if the problem case refuses necessary help, a housing corporation has an 
incentive to intervene: ‘you (FN:  a problematic resident) live in ‘our’ apartment so we can force 
you to accept professional help.’ We need better collaboration and coordination to prevent more 
people from being on the streets."157
What I find particular and relevant is the decisive solution-oriented language applied by 
Nieuwold. Martin Parker mentioned about that tendency that ‘many people believe that manage-
ment is a precondition for an organized society, for social progress and economic growth. If we 
have a difficulty (…) then the answer is often supposed to be better management. (…) Management
protects us against chaos and inefficiency, management guarantees that organizations, people and
machines do what they claim to do. (…) Management is democratic and transparent. It is a form of
organization that is premised on the efficient ordering of people and things in order that agreed 
collective goals can be achieved. (...) [Management] is the consolidation of order and efficiency, 
and who could be against order and efficiency? The common subtext behind these accounts of 
modernization is that progress is defined of defeating disorder. Chaos and disorganization are 
obstacles that need to be overcome.’ (Parker, 2002, P.2 & P.4). Does the exemplifying metaphorical 
power of Douglas’ cultural anthropological research in which dirt turned out to be ‘things out of 
156 See as well Deleuze and Guattari: ‘We think only about the Emperor. But not about the present one; or rather we 
would think about the present one if we knew who he was or knew anything definite about him. (…) (The people) do 
not know what emperor is reigning, and there exist doubts regarding even the name of the dynasty. (…) Long-dead 
emperors are set on the throne in our villages, and one that only lives in song recently had a proclamation of his read 
out by the priest before the altar. As for the subaggragates themselves, the primitive territorial machines, they are the 
concrete itself, the concrete base and beginning, but their segments here enter into relationships corresponding to the 
essence, they assume precisely this form of bricks that ensures their integration into the higher unity, and their 
distributive operation, consonant with the great collective designs of this same unity.’  (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. 
P.216,217).
157 Source: http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2175879-ook-jij-kan-in-een-vingerknip-dakloos-worden.html, consulted on 
14.06.2017.
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place’ explains why homeless people are sometimes considered filthy, dirty or confronting?158 
(1966). Are things-not-in-order the incentive for ordering? Does dirt represents order in its ab-
sence?
§2.4 [society] for [itself] 
Jacques Derrida’s ‘Rogues’ (2005) offers useful insights which connect various themes touched in 
this research, not at least Parker’s remarks about management as described on previous page. Ac-
cording to Derrida democracies work toward something incompatible, namely on the one hand [it]
aims to welcome people, to be hospitable towards deviants, but [it] aims so conditionally159 
though and therefore in the meantime democracies exclude deviants – Derrida spreaks of ‘rogues’ 
- as ‘all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others’. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.63). Derrida contextualizes 
this paradox within the problematic stress between equality and freedom. Democratic [societies] 
aim to be equal but ‘equality tends to introduce measure and calculation (and thus conditionality) 
whereas freedom is by essence unconditional, indivisible, (incommensurable and) heterogeneous 
to calculation and to measure.’ (Derrida, J. 2005. P.47, 48). Derrida clarifies in his lecture that it is 
impossible to command the incommensurable in a ‘just, equitable, equal, and measured fashion 
(as equality) does not consist in a commensurability of subjects in relation to some unit of mea-
sure. (…)  (Equality) is the equality of singularities in the incommensurability of freedom.’ (Derrida, 
J. 2005. P.50). Derrida mentions that [societies] apply a ‘technical measure of equality’ (Ibid.) 
which ‘obviously destroys or neutralizes the incommensurable singularity to which it gives effective
access.’ (Derrida, J. 2005. P.51). In other words, a technocratic approach ignores and aims to neu-
tralize the incommensurable singularities. (Derrida, J. 2005). As such, democracy takes essentially 
the form of a sovereign technocratic authority.160 In this way a sovereign system can reach out, 
158 See for example: ‘(D)irt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the 
beholder. (…) Dirt offends against order. Delaminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize 
the environment. (…) ‘It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, 
is never unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering 
involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a 
link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity. (…) It is a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it 
is dirty to place them on the dining table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the 
bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing.  (Douglas, M. 1966. P.2 & P.45). 
159 Democratic [societies] aim to open themselves up, offer hospitality, to the people excluded by their very own 
systems, but that happens in a conditional fashion and is hence limited. (Derrida, J. 2005). 
160 That is (…) having the power to decide, to be decisive, to prevail, to have reason over or win out over (…) and to 
give the force of law. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.51). 
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sanction and normalize as the incommensurables whom are considered as an auto-immune threat 
(Ibid.) as Schinkel has likewise described such tendency as social hypochondria. (2007, 2008). By 
this auto-immune defiency incommensurables are aimed to be molded as commensurables. Think 
in this case for example about the narratives of Ronald, Jonathan and Mirikitani, who according to 
themselves ‘fit in’ but according to social policies are ‘deviants’. This antinomy, this paradox, is ac-
cording to Derrida the problem between equality and freedom. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.50). Hence 
Derrida speaks ‘not of anarchic chaos but of structured disorder.’ (Derrida, J. 2005. P.66). [Societies]
act circularly ‘by themselves’ and for ‘themselves’ (Derrida, J. 2005) by not disentangling Western 
democracies’ essential unsolved and undertheorized problem of equality and freedom. (Ibid.).161 
I consider Derrida’s insights a relevant remark to the problems raised in the narratives of 
the homeless men described in the former chapter and narrated but as well explained by the para-
phrazation of Kafka’s ‘Chinese wall’, namely that the increasing bureaucratic pressure (as famously 
problematized by Habermas as the ‘systemworld’ versus the ‘livingworld’ of free communication). 
There is as well an increasing complexity162, for example the increase in professional subdivisions 
of welfare work, so to say lead to better care but as well as a fragmentization and hence to incom-
mensurability: Think of it as the more pieces of Chinese wall are builded the more ‘holes’ will deve-
lop. The inherent problems of incommensurability will be just an incentive for more governmenta-
lity, more normalisation and more sanctioning. Democracy might indeed follow Derrida’s com-
mand to that freedom is not to be measured, and hence at least consider that the instruments for 
equality are problematic and, probably rather frustrating and alienating to the intended ‘included’. 
§2.5 [society] represented by [itself]
Before the eighteenth century words were thought to resemble thoughts; ‘a word was thought it-
self.’ (Foucault, 2000. P.87). After that period, according to Foucault’s research, ‘a space opens be-
tween words and things: The fiction of unity between words and things is let go. (Ten Kate, un-
161 Agamben has stated a likewise fundamental critique to western democracy. 
162 See as a practical illustration for example Frohlich’s remark that ‘(n)o intervention approach can singly fulfill all 
public health goals. The more we intervene in the name of the public’s health, the more we learn about the 
positive and adverse effects of our strategies. A vulnerable population approach to public health is no exception, 
and it is likely to produce unintended effects. We can only speculate about such adverse effects, as shown in Table 
2.’ (Frohlich et al. 2008). The reference to the table might appear ironic, because speculation, an act where there is
unsufficient evidence, is nevertheless represented in a table. 
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known). Humans are in between the words and the things, without being able to make a unity be-
tween the two: ‘what was resemblance now becomes ‘representation’. (Dale, K. & B. Burrel. 2008. 
P.62). Not the direct presence counts, but the representation in our thinking. (Ten Kate, unknown).
Deleuze problematized representation vehemently, for example describing it as ‘the place 
of the transcendental illusion.’ (Deleuze, 2011. P. 390). According to Deleuze humans are often not 
really thinking (italics by author) in itself as long as difference is subjected to demands of represen-
tation. It should be investigated if and why problems can ‘always’ be subjugated to the demands of
representation. For example, the incompatable or uneven seems often inaccessible to our 
organizations and (collective) thinking, speaking and data gathering. (Deleuze, 2011). Difference163 
seems to be excluded of thinking; at least it has to be manufactured into a ‘tamed’ problem 
apparently, which means as much as that it has to be matched with representation. In other words 
real difference cannot really be comprehended in contemporary governmental organizations: 
‘other differences will be uneven, uncoordinated and inorganic: too big or too small, not just to be 
considered or thought but also to be. (...) From this it can be concluded that the difference remains 
in itself damned and has to be penalized or redeemed on the basis of the reason that makes it 
livable and conceivable so that it becomes an object of (…) representation.’164  (Deleuze, 2011. P. 
386). To represent is to ground, to found, to define, to determine in an operation of logos, the 
conquest of the uncertain and the infinite. (Deleuze, 2011). ‘How to produce, how to think about 
fragments whose sole relationship is sheer difference – fragments that are related to one another 
only in that each of them is different – without having recourse either to any sort of original 
totality?’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.45). Considering Deleuze’s grouse about representation, his 
idea about what a concept ought to do is relevant: A concept is ‘philosophical precisely because 
they create possibilities for thinking beyond165what is already known or assumed.’ (Colebrook, 
2002. P. 19).
163 ‘(D)ifference is the power that over and over again produces new forms.’ (Colebrook, C. 2004. P.123).
164 When difference is unthinkable, it will blur into a non-being according to Deleuze. (Deleuze, 2011).
165 ‘This is quite a different idea than Hegels insight: one could not have the being or identity of a thing without its 
concept, but the concept is always other than the simple immediacy of a thing. It differentiates the thing from other 
things; being is mediated through the concepts we have of it. We can only think what a thing is through (…) what it is 
not. (…) We only know a being from what it is not. (…) And thus for Hegel it is not that there is a world that is present 
that is then re-presented in concepts—it is only through the difference of concepts that we have the thought of the 
present world at all. Experience is mediated, differentiated and ordered through concepts. Deleuze referred to Hegel’s 
philosophy as one of ‘infinite representation’ (...), for it placed the representation of the world as the very being of the 
world.’ (Colebrook, 2002. P. 8,9).
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Let’s return to Nieuwold, the salvatian army representative quoted in the beginning of this thesis; 
‘homelessness as a management - and order problem?’ ‘The people-who-(allegedly)-do-not-fit-in’ 
as incentive for organization and better management and communication? I would have expected 
less decisiveness and more compassion from a religious salvation organization existing to relieve 
the precarious. Therefore I would like to refer Nieuwold to the allegory of the Chinese wall, with 
the remarks of Parker in our minds, on two connected occasions, namely that on the one hand, the
more pieces of wall are build the more openings there will be which can be trespassed or vandali-
zed (which is mentioned by the faint despondency of the bricklayers). Let us now relate Kafka’s al-
legory to contemporary Western social systems: Since the 1980’s there have been various develop-
ments and improvements for care in social work in The Netherlands: There are more and more di-
verse shelters, more diverse (mental) healthcare, more surveillance in public space, etcetera. (Mol,
2005). More organization! More communication! Governmentality worked!
And it didn’t! The more there is organized, the better, in a qualitative fashion, there has to 
more communication and moreover finetuning between different parties166, and therefore the 
more can go wrong. An increase in governmentality has led to an increase in care, which led to an 
increase of complexity.167 But we have as well noticed an increase in criminalization. As Foucault 
and Deleuze have pointed out in their writings, but as well what is currently common is that 
various (welfare) organizations are increasingly collecting data. With the increase of data it is in-
creasingly hard to process the bulk in a meaningful way. Think again of the allegory of the Chinese 
wall: I expect increasing problems in ‘fine-tuning’ the complexity of different social domains and 
organizations working to avoid homelessness. And people working on the sharp end of social work 
will be able to express that the increasing pressure of systematic checks and balances are frustra-
ting the practical oriented, so to say ‘hands on’, social work. (Edwards, 2013). As well I would like to
remind to Kafka whom wrote that the wanderers move more free and faster by default, and are 
better aware of the developments of the barriers against them.168 So Nieuwold’s decisive jargon 
sounds effective – it is exemplary of ‘’an ‘ethics of knowledge’ whereby we imagine that if we get 
the facts about some outside world169 right then we will know what to do’’ (Colebrook, C. 2002. 
P.71) - but that idealism might work out in unforeseen ways. After Vaihinger I would like to 
166 Think here about the contemporary scientific problem of incommensurability of disciplines.
167 See footnote 17 on complexity.
168 From personal workexperience I have found out it works best just to ask the homeless people what is happening in 
their lifeworlds, as they are by their defaults the experts on this field.
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consider that representational discourses could be considered as an ‘as if’: something which is fal-
se or incorrect can still be of practical importance, alike the Chinese wall (which is still not finished 
today by the way!) to create a China. Vaihingers approach is similar to Deleuze’s point of view, 
whom considers a ‘theory to be like a box of tools. It must be useful. It must function. (…) A theory 
does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself.’170 (Deleuze, 
1972). But we ought not forget the a priori limitedness of any frame. 
§2.6 some concluding remarks
Foucault considered biopolitics as a succession to disciplining sovereign powers that it ‘is therefore
not a matter of taking the individual at the level of individuality but, on the contrary, of using 
overall mechanisms and acting in such a way as to achieve overall states of equilibrium or 
regularity; it is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biopolitical processes of man-
as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized. (…) (A)djustment (to 
biopolitics after disciplinary mechanisms) was obviously much more difficult to make because it 
implied complex systems of coordination and centralization.’ (Foucault, M. 2003. P.247, 250). What 
I consider relevant in Kafka’s allegory is that it makes clear that the formation of the nation, as by 
Foucault’ mentioned centralization and coordination, is a double bind; On the one hand the wall 
aims to form as ‘static (...) that (is) imposed on discourse from the outside, and that define once 
and for all its characteristics and possibilities.’ (Foucault, 1972. P. 82) but in the meantime the 
opposite occurs, namely it manifests the impossibility of full centralization and coordination 
because of the increasing complex tasks manifests itself. However, Deleuze and Guattari mention 
that in order to function a social system ‘must not function well.’171(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. 
169A key assumption in solutionism is that problems can be tamed, hence the importance of a scientific exteriority, that
that interpretation will provide a foundation in order to know what to do. (Colebrook, C. 2002).
170 Source: https://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze, 
consulted 17.06.2017.
171 ‘No one has ever died from contradictions. And the more it breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it 
works.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.166). See as well Deleuze and Guattari: ‘It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by
a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the 
corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole 
bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a 
permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest 
theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which on? It is not localizable), the barriers 
between offices cease to be ‘a definitive dividing line’ and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves 
them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfiguers impossible to recognize or identify, 
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P.166). And as well, the protagonist in ‘The Chinese wall’ makes clear that the abyss of foundation 
gives space for creative thought. For example it appears that many social workers realize the 
relativity of the ‘ethics of knowledge’ (Edwards, 2004) and work their way around bureaucracies.
Let us consider governmentality once more: In contemporary [societies] we have witnessed
a decrease of tolerance for deviating people, and from there a call for more strict (in other words 
repressive and sanctioning) policies.172 More governmentality leads to more complexity, and that 
results in an increasing demand for government, and so forth. The ideal end state of perfect do-
main [society] can by default not be achieved, but the rationale for governmentality, namely [per-
fect domain society] does not seem to be problematized in contemporary common political dis-
course. And what else to posit than a secularized ideal in a time when there is no God(s) nor Real 
politics? This I would like to relate to the more existential remark of Kafka’s brick builder: ‘We are 
loyal, but to something alien and essentially strange. This weakness is most importance to us, it is 
binding us people. This absence and weakness is the ground on which we live.’ (Italics by F.N.). 
Colebrook pondered if ‘we will be able to imagine a power or thought that no longer emanates 
from a grounding life, that no longer signifies a receding sense whose order we can neither fully 
read nor definitively flee?’ Colebrook, 2004. P.1 I think Kafka and his bricklayers have mentioned 
so.
Morin mentioned that a closed system flounders into a state of entropy173, which will lead 
to openings for different approaches. Hypochondriac [society] (Schinkel, 2007) reproduces itself, 
but it opens as well a space which could be distinctly new, different and creative. So instead of 
idealism, where experience and things make sense as organized in a representative fashion, our 
contemporary experiences in a globalized world, and the experiences of Ronald, Jonathan and 
Mirikitani may invite us to think in new ways ignoring prior categories: ‘Many homeless individuals 
are willing to accept help from the psychiatric services, but may find the services inflexible and 
inaccessible and unable to meet their multi-dimensional and complex needs. Many mentally ill 
homeless people are just too impaired to deal with the bureaucracy of the mental health services. 
discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the 
rigid segments.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.235, 236).
172 Of which Nieuwold’s decisiveness is exemplary:  Especially from a religious aid worker I would expect compassion 
instead of ‘solutions.´ See for examples of repressive policies §1.5 & §1.6.
173 Entropy: ‘A: the degradation of the matter and energy in the universe to an ultimate state of inert uniformity. B:   a 
process of degradation or running down or a trend to disorder.’ Source: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/entropy, consulted 19.06.2017.
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(…) The homeless mentally ill often suffer from multiple handicaps, yet there are administrative 
barriers that hinder their access to health care. Once homeless the mentally ill are at a serious 
disadvantage when they seek medical care. Their lack of accommodation174 makes it difficult for 
them to register with general practitioners and even when that has been accomplished, the slavish 
adherence by psychiatric services to catchment area boundaries may curtail further progress. 
(Bhugra, 2007. P.88 & 102).
In biopolitical studies it is not uncommon to make a choice between an Agambian ap-
proach, with a focus on bare life and a sovereign, and a Foucaultian approach with a focus on 
among other things governmentality. (Selmeczi, A. 2014). In the descriptions of Mirikitani and 
Ronald I have touched in a way to the matter of the creation of bare life, how people are getting rid
of their rights. This is a relevant aspect, especially considered that sometimes, like in Jonathan’s 
case it seems at times he is turning into bare life because of the impossibility to have the proper 
governmental care, and the absence of that leads to criminalization and further depravation. How-
ever, as well in Mirikitani’s case, think of the quoted ‘check-in’ at the nursing home, a problematic 
governmentality is not to be underestimated. In that regard there is no clear distinction between 
Agamben and Foucault’s approaches in my research: It had crossed my mind to consider the 
abstract idealism and transcendentalism of [society], with its bureaucratic interventions, as a 
sovereign, which leads to ‘exclusion’ through ‘inclusion’. Instead of ‘Adapt or die’ (Lindroth, M. & 
Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014) I considered the specific biopolitical insight in this study initially in
the described practices more as ‘perishing because of adaptation’; The problems described in this 
study have more to with the problematic administration of life than the cruel rule on death. 
This research has aimed to explain in a theoretical explorative manner that analytical grids 
do not comprehend the unruly complexity of multiplicities.175 Exemplary of such an intent is the 
decisive jargon of the 2017 Dutch Salvation Army. Technocratic and therefore allegedly ‘neutral’ 
and ‘objective’ solutionism is distinguishing (political-) issues. Governmentality is not a neutral 
174 Instead of what Schinkel considered ‘prepression’ (Schinkel, 2007), a form of pro-active governmentality, to invest 
in more general care; such as (mental) healthcare, education, workplacement and cheap social housing. However, that 
is out of vogue in contemporary neoliberism, and hence the more interventionist style of authorities, regulating the 
people, but not investing structurally. 
175 See as well Deleuze & Guattari remark: ‘It has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the 
axes of significance and subjectification belonging to it. It has generated, sctructuralized the rhizome, and when it 
thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That is why the tracing is so dangerous. It 
injects redundencies and propagates them.’  (Deleuze G. & F. Guattari. 1983. P.15).
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venture: at least not to the people176 designated by governmentality, think of for example Ronald’s 
narrative. How can it be that if a homeless person belongs to a place, that a social worker ‘helping’ 
or ‘giving care to’ the person is assuming they do not belong? After his research I considered go-
vernmentality as essential to [inclusion] policies, and that a representation of [society] is currently 
commonplace in [integration] discourse. It is not that [inclusion] works counterproductive by 
default, but it occurs. It all depends on structural societal systems and the agency (life skills) and 
perceptions of the person whom is addressed by the policy.
I consider that an immanent approach, to approach something how it is told to you, for 
example by a homeless person, less violent than an idealistic and representative perspective. I 
would like to plea for a more listening attitude to people whom are ‘supposed’ to be (included). It 
can be very refreshing to consider different viewpoints177 , or actually just ask what is needed to 
the particular person, even if that persons wishes to leave him/her alone and hence denies care. 
As Bhugra, as cited on the former page, homeless people are often not a priori against help, but 
feel that the care does not fit their situations. (Bhugra, 2007). It will probably improve the work 
relation with a ‘deviant’ if you can communicate before applying technocratic language. 
However, do not over identify with homeless people! For example, I have an impression 
that some, more or less radical thinkers, such as Willse, overemphasize structural descriptions and 
underestimate the lack of lifeskills of homeless people. Social workers and -scientists ought to 
consider structures ánd personal narratives, -views and capabilities.178 ‘In contrast to 
transcendence as an ‘ethics of knowledge’ where we seek to obey some ultimate truth, Deleuze 
described his own philosophy as an ethics of amor fati: as love of what is (and not as the search for
some truth, justification or foundation beyond, outside or transcendent to what is) (...). Part of this 
process of affirming ‘what is’ meant that philosophy had to be more than critical. It was not 
enough to expose the illusions of transcendence, not enough to show that all our invented 
foundations – such as God, Being or Truth – were inventions rather than givens. We also need to 
176 Therefore I find Ronald’s, Mirikitani’s and Jonathan’s worldviews relevant for this study, because their historic 
awareness of their alleged (exclusion).
177‘Lyotard uses the term agon to refer to a wrestling match between incommensurable language games. (1988). This 
is a match that must carry on, cannot be won or lost, because the opponents can never be resolved to each other. They 
occupy different ‘forms of life’, different social universes, which cannot be compared for their rightness or wrongness 
(...).’ (Parker, 2002. P.100).
178 Foucault warned against a phenomenological approach in where the experience of individuals prevails above 
societal structures. According to Foucault such an approach would neglect the genesis of structures in which such 
perceptions are developing. 
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see the positive side of this inventive process. What is thinking such that it can enslave itself to 
images of some great outside? Does this not tell us that there is something productive, positive 
and liberating about the very power of thought?’ (Colebrook, C. 2002. P.71). In inventive processes,
we might as well realize there might be actually ways out of some objected discourses!
As people live in complex worlds nowadays, governmentality is indeed a difficult and 
precarious endeavor – or, as I have tried to explain, so it should be considered. I would not like to 
plea for the abandonment of theoretical, ideal and representational frames of thought and 
speaking, but humans ought to be aware they never fit completely in the multiple complexity of 
ongoing processes. As I have tried to point out, frameworks could totalize, but in their attempt to 
include, there will be meaning and creativity ‘flowing away’. Therefore, I cannot conclude that 
policies to (include) people are counterproductive, because policies and theories have often 
unforeseen outcomes, as the complex multiples are never fully ‘grasped’ by bureaucracies and 
systems. There will be always be unforeseen situations and outcomes, but such provides exactly 
the space for creative approaches and acts, as for example welcomed by Deleuze. However, I think 
that the framing of the [integration discourse] could be more nuanced and less stringent: as 
immanent problems in immanent but open spaces, where at least the normativity of every system 
and idea would not be put as absolute. Are welfare policies to ‘include’ homeless people 
counterproductive? In this research I have  explained that it is possible that people are getting 
rather frustrated by [inclusion] and that it hence does the opposite of what it allegedly aims for. 
But that depends basically on the individual case. However, as by-product [inclusion] seems in a 
negative-but-therefore-productive way, as bottomless or abyss, a constitution of [societies] or 
democracies. Secondly, the limited applicability of [inclusion] provides as well spaces and 
incentives to act creatively. 
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Chapter three: Conclusion - Are welfare policies to [include] homeless people counter-
productive?
In the literature review we have considered numerous biopolitical studies on homelessness. Most 
of these studies were situated in the U.S.. Especially Willse’s take on homelessness and biopolitics 
exhibits a stress of the biopolitical investment in productive life and the disinvestment of 
unproductive life, in other words, the ‘letting die’ of problematic people. This study is not about 
U.S. policies of homelessness though. We will not, without further studies, a priori disagree with 
Willse’s analysis, but the context of northern European (post-)welfare policies are just qualitatively 
different. This study problematized the rather linear take of disinvestment of people in problematic
situations in the U.S., although the narratives of Jonathan and especially Mirikitani, whom’s 
citizenship has been revoked after the Pearl Harbour attacks are relevant and illustrative of state 
racism. The narratives of the paraphrased men, Ronald, Mirikitani and Jonathan show that these 
men - irregardless of their problems, problems which they do not deny - make explicit they feel a 
sense of belonging to their environments, to the streets they live on and the people they know. 
Their lifes makes sense, at least to themselves and to whom is willing to listhen to their stories.  
However, a biopolitical problem of [society] described in the second chapter ought to take a more 
critical stance than ‘just a dialogical attitude’ typical of a humanistic liberal progressive attitude; as 
it seems the narratives and meaning of the homeless people themselves are biopolitically 
incommensurable with most caring organizations. For example, the quoted ‘check-in’ of Mirikitani 
shows the difficulty how to provide care to people without the proper social security credentials. 
The people who need care and protection most are by default excluded from such safetynets. 
Foucault, Deleuze and Schinkel have pointed out that societies in themselves need a fundament, 
which function as normalizing mechanisms, and hence produce bare life, people who can not 
receive ‘investment in life’. Not because of a racism of bad intentions, but a racism as a belief in the
excellent functionality of care- and support organizations. 
In a way, this thesis has been unintentionally a problematization of the rather unidirectional
critique to biopolitics in the U.S. by critical scholars, because even if there exist social policies to 
prevent some people to ‘let to die’, practical problems are not solved at all. It might even be, that 
that systemic unclarity might be just very confusing. (Arnold, 2004). However, as I have described 
in the first chapter, criminalization is as well applied in The Netherlands. Criminalization serves as 
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incentive for ‘perpetual offenders’ to be incorperated in a penal- and rehabilitation regime. So, 
‘soft’- and ‘hard’ approaches to homeless people are at the same time applied by different 
organizations. Some people are so to say ‘alumni’ in criminal- and rehabiliation regimes, in fact are 
‘deviants’ from an early age (as many homeless people spend their youth in orphanages and jails). 
Nowadays, in post welfarestates there is an increasing importance for a decent social network in 
order to care for one another. However, for many homeless people their homeless peers are their 
social network. Hence it is very hard for homeless people to leave this spheres, as they simple are 
alienated from more ‘productive’ people. Therefore I would think it would be more kind, and 
likewise less pressuring on caring institutions such as police, social workers, rehabilitation 
therapists and psychiatrists to consider a small amount of people as inable to have a conventional 
productive life and respect their lifespheres as home and normal. However, there seems to be an 
increasing systemic-biopolitical impossibility to let deviants to be, well, deviant. The increased 
criminalization is of course exemplifying of a decrease of tolerance. In the meantime positivist 
approaches, put simply, a belief that all problems can and will be solved, lead to an increasing 
regime of surveillance and discipline. This is causing increasing stress and inconvenience to 
homeless people, whom will then might exhibit more ‘problematic’ behavior than otherwise (if 
you seach harder you find more deviant behavior). As well, de facto systems can not comprehend 
that for some people there is just not a fitting place, for example people without identitypapers. 
With the parabel of Kafka’s Chinese wall I have tried to explain that the more people assume better
and more organization will solve problems, because of complexity, there will be more unforeseen 
problems. Secondly such a metaphorical wall functions as a constitution of a fixed space. 
Throughout the thesis I have refrained from the application of the word [society], although still 
applied with the brackets. Was it fair to pretend not to use it, while just putting the word in 
between brackets? Apparently I could not come up with anything better, but at least we were 
critical about it throughout. Namely, Foucault, Deleuze, Schinkel and Willse have pointed out that 
the reference of society becomes an objective, as a foundational body. In order to apply biopolitics 
there needs to be coordination and central control. As the religious or existential humanistic 
philosophical moral values can not engage and unite, apparently it is most productive to apply 
negatives, to have increasing control over people, whereas the deviants are forming the norm. In 
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an ongoing process of globalization such an narrow approach to humans living together might just 
increase the call for biopolitics. 
However, in such lines we may witness still some tacit liberal progressive humanist ideology
which not fully comprehends the biopoltical realities of today. Hence, ’are welfare policies to 
[include] homeless people counterproductive?’ is indeed a rather naive question, and a more 
conventional approach to a research should have instructed me to adjust the question. However, I 
have decided in the design of the research to proceed with this question, namely because it might 
clarify the stress between liberal progressive idealism and nihilistic biopolitics. Often in care, if 
asked to the motivation of professionals and volunteers working shelters, there is a lot of idealism 
and not much understanding of biopolitical regimes.179 Personally a development from a very 
idealistic social worker to a study of more abstract remarks by Foucault on neoliberal biopolitics 
has been exemplary of an initial unclarity about the implications of biopolitics. 
So, to answer the question: I think that on the perspective of a citizen, as juridical political 
actor with rights, policies to [include] people can be counterproductive. If it is so or not depends a 
lot on the particular situation of the care available and on the agency of the particular homeless 
person. However, the question about where one has to [included] in, as normatize domain, is 
usually neglected and one might find out, with an open and listhening attitude that people feel 
home where they are, and might feel more alienated and less capable to deal with a life with, for 
example, a roof (’of their own’) above their head. I think this might explain why [inclusion] policies 
to long-term homeless people are often not productive. This leads to frustration, which results in a 
further persistency to avoid care, and such to criminalization. And in case people are exposed to 
regimes of forced care, it is likely that the care does not lead to [integration] at all.  
And on such a hinge, on this pivot point, the naïve idealism of the progressive liberal social 
worker, blurs with the domains of biopolitics: Namely, from a biopolitical point of view such failing 
and erronous policies can be just incentives for more biopolitics; More persistent care (for example
in closed institutions, etcetera), more surveillance, more criminalization. ’’In judging deviant 
people, by default it is as well defined what is ‘normal’.’’(Arnold, K. 2004. P.32). So, biopolitical 
179 For example, Willse explains that humans are not to be seen "from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion 
of subject, but as a sort of technical political object of management and government" that is "dependent on a 
series of variables. Thus, the species is brought into governance, when population becomes the object of 
biopolitics, when population can reveal the species or life itself through statistically organized probabilities. " 
(Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.5).
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power affirms itself in the structural inabilities to deal with certain problems, certain groups of 
people, such as homeless or sans papiers. Scholars such as Willse imply that policies are poorly 
thought trough, as some kind of bad will such as racism. Willse implies it is poor design by default, 
but I have an impression it is more of an incapability to organise our societal organizations any 
better. 
Should there then be less care? This research has not intended to deny the importance of 
care. But it might be less frustrating for the people targeted by the care or by people working with 
these groups of people to consult what they consider good care or what they need. For such there 
seems in these biopolitical days less and less space. And maybe we have to accept that sometimes 
it is just impossible to put all the pieces together, as if there was a fitting puzzle. That we accept 
there are people smelling bad and behaving annoyingly in public space. But public space is gone 
already; Some progressive liberal with ideals about citizen rights has still sometimes difficulties to 
sense the depths and consequences of biopolitics. 
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